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ADR: THE NEW EQUITY
Thomas 0. Main *
The course of justice is like the alternation of the seasons. There is the
hope and inspiration of spring and the achievement and reward of
summer, and there is the descent and sacrifice of autumn and the moral
and intellectual destitution of winter, and the changes in our jurisprudence
will come accordingly in spite of us, however much we may be the
appointed instruments in their consummation. I
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has
transformed the administration of civil justice. As both a rival and a
complement to formal adjudication, ADR presents an alternative forum
for most disputes. ADR offers a system with procedural flexibility, a
broad range of remedial options, and a focus on individualized justice.
ADR performs convenient and useful works that cannot be done, or
cannot easily be done, through formal adjudication. And in every case
in which one of the various modes of ADR offers a process or reaches a
result that differs materially from those of the formal courts, there is in
fact a rival system. Thus, contemporary civil justice is administered by
dual systems, with formal adjudication on one hand, and a constellation
of ADR methods on the other.
The administration of justice through divided systems is a familiar
model. For centuries the Anglo-American legal system administered
justice through the systems of Law and Equity. The Law courts ensured
uniformity and predictability, while courts in Equity tempered the law to
the needs of the particular case. Although there was considerable
tension between the two regimes, they were also symbiotic. Over time
the Law courts adopted many of the best practices of Equity.
Meanwhile, efforts to crystallize the jurisdiction of Equity introduced
complexity and procedural technicalities that turned that system into a
*. Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. The author
thanks Professor Stephen Subrin, teacher and mentor par excellence, for his comments and insight.
Professors Amitai Aviram, Richard Marcus, Dan Markel, Greg Pingree, Carl Tobias, Kojo Yelpaala, and
others also generously offered their very useful comments.
1. Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 SOLIC. J. & WKLY REP. 572, 572 (1923).
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jus strictum differing little from the Common Law. With each system
looking increasingly like the other, Law and Equity were merged into a
single system in a wave of reforms in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The reformers envisioned a unified procedural
apparatus that would permit judges to jointly administer the substance of
both law and equity. However, an important ingredient of the
jurisprudence of Equity was displaced by the procedural merger: a
merged system offered no recourse from the procedural apparatus itself
when the unique needs of a particular case demanded a different
procedure. Moreover, the substance of equity lost much of its vitality in
the merged system.
The system of ADR stands in this breach created by the merger of
Law and Equity. ADR offers an alternative system for relief from the
hardship created by the substantive and procedural law of formal
adjudication. Moreover, the freedom, elasticity, and luminance of ADR
bear a striking resemblance to traditional Equity, offering relaxed rules
of evidence and procedure, tailored remedies, a simpler and less
legalistic structure, improved access to justice, and a casual relationship
with the substantive law. Alas, the dark side of ADR is also reminiscent
of Equity: unaccountability, secrecy, an inability to extend its
jurisdictional reach beyond the parties immediately before it, and a
certain vulnerability to capture by special interests.
The reincarnation of equity through ADR illustrates a pervasive
dialectic between law and equity. Conflict between the goals of
certainty and individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude in the
law toward equity, to which the law is attracted by reason of the
identification of equity with a general sense of justice, but which the law
ultimately rejects because of the law's concern for certainty. Hence, a
vibrant system of Equity mediated the strict law until it, too, became
bound and confined by the channels of its own precedents and the
technicalities of its own procedures. ADR emerged, in turn, as the
equitable alternative. And the pattern repeats: the remarkable popularity
of ADR leads inevitably, albeit ironically, to reforms that would
constrain that very system.
This Article uses an equity paradigm to develop a theory of ADR and,
where necessary, to guide reform. Preserving equity through ADR is
important because no set of prohibitive or declaratory rules will do
justice in all cases or will anticipate all situations. Because
unimaginable events are inevitable, some alternative or escape from
rule-bound formalism is important. Indeed, equity is a progressive force
in the law. When formal adjudication cannot provide a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy, the system of ADR should be flexible enough to
330
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deliver individualized justice. The repeated exercise of that protean
jurisdiction identifies systemic failures of the formal system and
ultimately wields a reforming influence. The need for an autonomous
system of discretionary law may be as great as or greater than ever.
Thus, the Article argues that equity should make the most of the modem
instrument, ADR, as it once did of the subpoena.
This Article consists of five steps. Parts II and III are largely
descriptive. Part II briefly describes the emergence of ADR as a court of
general civil jurisdiction. Part III calls attention to the characteristics of
traditional equity that are echoed in the system of ADR.
Parts IV and V analyze the dynamic and oppositional forces of law
and equity. Part IV focuses on the interplay of those forces between the
traditional dual systems of Law and Equity. Part V focuses on the
contemporary dual systems of formal adjudication and ADR.
Finally, Part VI is prescriptive, arguing that flexibility and discretion
should prevail in ADR processes even when pragmatism may demand
detail and complexity. ADR must be free of the procedural
paraphernalia of certainty and predictability to perform its
complementary role in the administration of justice through dual
systems. Contemporary efforts to standardize and restrict the processes
of ADR recognize the right problem, but propose the wrong solution.
The problem is the number and significance of cases that are resolved
outside of formal adjudication. The solution is not reform of the
alternative system that is drawing them in, but rather reform of the
formal system that is driving them away.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEM OF ADR
There are numerous social, cultural, and practical forces that steer
disputing parties away from state-sponsored adjudicatory processes. 2
Accordingly, some grievances never become disputes at all.3 Some
2. See generally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525 (1981) (describing the range and reporting
the incidence of grievances, claims, and civil legal disputes).
3. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don 't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5,
12-16 (1983) (suggesting that "only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; [and] only
a small portion of these become lawsuits;" and that formal lawsuits are more likely to settle than to
litigate); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence
for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2002) (reporting that "HPMS data showed that
only 13% of negligent injuries ... resulted in malpractice claims"); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 63 (1974) (noting that persons with
grievances will often avoid potential conflict).
2005]
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disputes are resolved through private negotiations that lead to
consensual solutions.4 And some disputes are resolved in a triangulated
process facilitated by a neutral third party who is not a judge.5  Even
among those cases that are pursued in the courts, the vast majority are
resolved by means other than a judicial determination. 6 The many paths
of extrajudicial dispute resolution have been trod for centuries, and
probably always will be."
4. See, e.g., Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, I 1 LAW &
Soc'Y REV, 701, 713-14 (1977) (finding only 3.7% voiced complaints studied reached any third party;
only 16% of those brought to third parties were brought to a lawyer or court); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637
(1976) (exploring the relationship between negotiation and official processes).
Even when a dispute is resolved by settlement, the aggrieved may not take the additional step(s)
required to be compensated. According to a fee-based service that offers to search its database of recent
class action settlement funds, "more than half of those entitled to payment fail to file a claim."
Unclaimed Class Action Lawsuit Settlement Funds Search, http://www.unclaimedassets.com/
classaction-lawsuit.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
5. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297, 309-28 (1996).
6. A federal court study shows that in 2002 the percentage of federal civil cases tried had
dropped to 1.8% from 11.5% in 1962. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). See also
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel
Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2001-02 & nn. 94-96 (2004).
7. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 4 (1983) ("In many and varied
communities, over the entire sweep of American history, the rule of law was explicitly rejected in favor
of alternative means for ordering human relations and for resolving the inevitable disputes that arose
between individuals."); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 137-40 (1991) ("[L]egal instrumentalists have tended to underappreciate the role that nonlegal
systems play in achieving social order"),
State law is the Johnny-come-lately on the scene, because the State itself is a relatively
recent development. When we look realistically at the way disputes are resolved
currently in even the most State-saturated society, it is obvious that State dispute
resolution techniques play only a backup role. From two teenagers bickering in the
backyard to disputes among giant corporations, State techniques, if pertinent at all, come
to the fore only if all else fails.
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 4 (1992) (footnote omitted). See also Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future
ofADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2003).
The history of arbitration, in particular, has been successfully mined. See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre,
Development of CommercialArbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical
Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 132-34 (1934); FRANCES KELLOR,
ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (1952); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial
Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193; James B. Boskey, A History of
Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 1 (1976) (tracing English and colonial
roots of commercial arbitration); Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration
Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic
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Certain contours of the dispute resolution landscape changed in the
1970s, as formal adjudication faced special criticism and pressures.8
Courts experienced an "explosion" of new and complex cases,9
"discovery abuse" reached intolerable levels, 10 and an unprecedented
lack of civility among lawyers delayed the resolution of cases and
jeopardized the reputation of the profession." Critics complained that
ordinary citizens no longer had meaningful access to the courts;
12
Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
For some history of the mediation movement, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
15-32 (1994).
8. Some scholars might date the transformation to the previous decade. See JAMES ALFINI ET
AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2001) ("[M]ediation's prominence and expanded use
emerged in the United States in the late 1960's as part of the 'movement' known as 'Alternative Dispute
Resolution.' (ADR)."); but see id. at 12 ("As activities coalesced during the 1970s, several important
efforts to improve practice and theory emerged.").
9. John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Macklin
Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Bayless Manning,
Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REv. 767 (1977); Maurice Rosenberg, Let's Everybody
Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (1972); Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil To
Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801 (1971) (referring to "glutted calendars and
mobbed courtrooms; the unconscionable delays, alternating with rush-rush-rush; the mistreatment of
jurors and witnesses; the excessive expense; [and] the tarnished image of justice for millions of
Americans"). See generally Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292 n.44 (2002) (claiming that the term "litigation explosion" first
appeared in print in 1970 and attributing it to Justice Macklin Fleming of the California Court of
Appeals); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability
Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 985 (2003) ("The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial system first became
prominent in the 1970s."); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1984) (discussing the "litigation explosion"); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and
Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461,465 (1984) (same); Gresham M.
Sykes, Cases, Courts and Congestion, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 327, 328 (Laura Nader ed.,
1969) ("Part of the difficulty in getting rid of court congestion appears to be... [that] it is not simply an
accidental defect of the law, but is rooted in some of the legal system's most cherished characteristics.").
10. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); C. RONALD ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR
DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979).
11. See Warren Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971); Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
Two other reform currents may merit mention here. First, it was during this decade that prohibitions
on advertising by lawyers were lifted. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Russell G. Pierce & Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983). Second, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was created in
1969 when the American Bar Association grouped and adopted nearly fifty canons from various state
bar associations. See generally Jason J. Kilborn, Who's in Charge Here?: Putting Clients in Their
Place, 37 GA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
12. See, e.g., Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1001 n.16
(1979) ("Our legal system has taken too literally the ancient maxim, 'de minimis non curat lex.'
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business clients, too, were demanding more efficient dispute resolution
alternatives. 1
3
In April 1976, acknowledging a certain amount of "deferred
maintenance" in the courts, Chief Justice Burger convened the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice.14  This extraordinary event brought together
three hundred conferees from the bench, bar, and academia. 15 The
varied agendas of this crowd adumbrated dozens of problems ranging
from the excesses of diversity jurisdiction and the prosecution of
(quoting REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 41 (1924))); Laura Nader & Linda R. Singer,
Law in the Future: What are the Choices? Dispute Resolution .. ., 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 281 (1976);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, SOME HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1973); Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1978); Russell G. Pearce, Patrick
W. Shea & Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal
Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977);
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979) (bemoaning "the persistent inaccessibility of judicial
relief for poor and middle-class people").
13. See, e.g., Raymond G. Leffler, Dispute Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. 254
(1976); Timothy S. Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not
Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J. 1 (1975); Howard M. Haltzmann, The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in
Resolving Community and Racial Disputes Affecting Business, 29 BUS. LAW. 1005 (1974); Laurence
Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1978, at 15;
ARBITRATION-COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS (A. Widiss ed., 1979); Robert
F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigaiton: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery
Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253 (1985); Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our
Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 181 (2003) (discussing the early effort of the business
community in "Getting to Yes and Getting Rid of Juries").
14. The conference adopted the precise title of Roscoe Pound's 1906 indictment at the American
Bar Association's annual meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota. Pound had then criticized the "sporting theory
of justice," "our exaggerated contentious procedure," and "our archaic system of courts." Pound's
speech was a catalyst for reform efforts leading ultimately to the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act and
uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 945
(1987). The 1976 conference, which has come to be known as the Pound Conference, symbolically was
also held in St. Paul, Minnesota. Chief Justice Burger proudly stated that the Pound Conference was
addressing the "unfinished business" placed on the American Agenda by Pound's 1906 speech. Warren
E. Burger, Preface, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE N THE FUTURE 5, 5 (A.
Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). See generally Symposium, The Impact of Mediation: 25
Years After the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 527 (2002).
15. According to the published list, approximately sixty percent of the conferees were judges or
court administrators; fewer than 10% were law professors; and about fifteen percent were various
representatives of the American Bar Association. Conferees haled from forty-eight of the fifty states
(and also from Puerto Rico and American Samoa). See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, Appx. C, at 355-68 (list of conferees). I fantasize that the State
of Montana was purposely excluded in an effort to spite the legacy of Thomas J. Walsh, the noble
senator therefrom who for nearly two decades almost single-handedly blocked the adoption of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Subrin, supra note 14, 996-99. Alas there is probably some mundane
explanation: West Virginia, too, appears to have had no representative in attendance.
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victimless crimes to the right to a jury trial and the dearth of empirical
research.16  The conference "arous[ed] a new spirit of zeal for
fundamental procedural reform" and endorsed innovation.' 
7
Our own great hope for the Pound Conference is that it will be
remembered in the year 2000 not simply as a lively colloquium of experts
but as the occasion when, under the strong leadership of the Chief Justice,
Twentieth Century law reform in the United States really got under way.
For this reason, we invite the reader's particular attention to the reports of
the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, which appear at the end of
this book. The campaign for procedural improvement must be waged on
many fronts, and the reports of the Task Force provide a unique and
valuable map of the terrain as well as the first practical step, and a highly
encouraging one, towards the attainment of Agenda 2000 A.D.1
8
The papers presented at the conference were published in a bound
volume entitled The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the
Future. '9 The book title's upbeat and reformist tone is revealing in light
of the title of the conference itself.
20
Professor Frank Sander's speech at the Pound Conference, entitled
Varieties of Dispute Processing, envisioned "by the year 2000 not
simply a court house but a Dispute Resolution Center, where the
grievant would first be channelled through a screening clerk who would
then direct him to the process (or sequence of processes) most
appropriate to his type of case. 21  Sander suggested that dispute
16. Robert H. Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 150 (advocating for the
abolition of diversity jurisdiction); Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE
POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 51 (inviting the
legislative branch to reexamine the possibility of decriminalizing dunkenness, prostitution, and
gambling); Walter Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion?, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 171 (suggesting that trial by
jury in civil cases has no contemporary justification); Laura Nader, Commentary in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 114 (emphasizing the
absence of important data).
17. William T. Gossett et al., Foreword to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 7, 15. Cf John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of
1906: The Spark that Kindles the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 176, 176
(1937) (crediting Pound's speech as "the spark that kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now
spreading through the entire legal profession").
18. Gossett et al., supra note 17, at 15.
19. Nader, supra note 16.
20. Query whether Pound's reforms might have been more warmly embraced and more promptly
enacted, had the title of his speech "Causes for Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice" enjoyed the benefit of such handlers. See generally Wigmore, supra note 17. With regard to
the events in the intervening decades between Pound's speech and the legislative reform, see Subrin,
supra note 14.
21. Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
2005]
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resolution required a flexible and diverse panoply of processes to meet
the systematic needs of entire categories of certain types of cases and
also the unique circumstances presented in particular cases.22 Although
he did not himself then use the phrase "multi-door courthouse," such is
the frequent characterization of his ideal.23 Moreover, his remarks are
often credited as marking the birth of the modem ADR movement.24
The ADR movement found traction because it intertwined threads of
the political left25 and right, 26 responded to a genuine problem within
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 65, 84.
22. See id. at 72-79 (outlining criteria for determining how particular disputes might best be
resolved). See also Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 217 (1973).
23. See Stempel, supra note 5, at 331 nn.Il0 & 111. Professor Stempel points out that Sander
used the term in a subsequent article. Id. (citing Frank E.A Sander, The Multi-door Courthouse, NAT'L
FORUM, Fall 1983, at 24.
24. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 n.3 (2003); Developments, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1853 n.9 (2000); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The
Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Stempel, supra note 5, at 309; E. WENDY
TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW
AND BUSINESS 3-4, 29 (1996); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy
and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5-6
(1993); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 269 (1988); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 n.17 (1986).
25. See generally Ralph Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements,
11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247, 255 (1976) ("The [legal] system must be designed to encourage the
nonlegal resolution of disputes, and public participation in planning processes, as well as more
traditional legal activity like litigation."); William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive
Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 384-87 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little
Justice, ATLANTIC, July 1979, at 25; FORD FOUNDATION, MEDIATING SOCIAL CONFLICT 4 (1978) (third-
party intervention efforts supported by Ford Foundation include mediation, arbitration, facilitation, fact-
finding, and conciliation); FORD FOUNDATION, CURRENT INTERESTS OF THE FORD FOUNDATION: 1978
AND 1979 6-7 ("The [Ford] Foundation plans to support investigations of new ways of settling disputes
that may be more equitable, cheaper, and less divisive than the adversary process.").
26. Chief Justice Burger and others viewed ADR as a mechanism for lightening the caseload of
judges. See, e.g., Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982)
(advocating private binding arbitration as "a better way to do it"); Derek Bok, The President's Report to
the Board of Overseers of Harvard College, 1981-1982, reprinted in N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 8, and
N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1983, at 31; M.W. Cannon, Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for
Alternatives, NAT'L FORUM, Fall 1983, at 10; Thomas Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb.
8, 1976, at 17, 21; Jarrold K. Footlick, Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42, 47; Manning,
supra note 9, at 780; Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1360-63; Tribe, supra note 25, at 25. Owen Fiss wrote
that Chief Justice Burger was not "moved by love, or by a desire to find new ways to restore or preserve
loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and politics. He seeks alternatives to litigation
in order to reduce the caseload of the judiciary or, even more plausibly, to insulate the status quo from
reform by the judiciary." Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985). See also
Stempel, supra note 5, at 344 ("ADR's biggest boosters are commercial organizations, employers,
insurers, political conservatives and Republicans.").
Another procedural reform current bears mention here. The year 1976 also brought the Court's
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the legal profession, 27 and resonated with a changing sociopolitical
culture.28  Litigants of all types had a new forum for dispute
resolution,29 courts had competition,30 the academy had a new
discipline, 31 and the rhetoric of peaceful problem-solving offered a
decision in Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), reflecting a certain diminution in the guarantees
of due process. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
27. ABA REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION 11-12
(Frank E.A. Sander ed., 1977); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
28. Alternative dispute settlement agencies have emerged, I believe, because there is, in the
United States, a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with, and a more critical attitude towards,
professionals, an increasing consciousness that America and Americans must recapture a sense
of "community," and a growing feeling that individuals must play a more active role in
determining how their lives are to be lived. Mediation centers and similar agencies are, to a
large extent, a response to these concerns.
David N. Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 209
(1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976)
(examining society's evolving expectations of courts and judges).
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much
Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 212 (2002/2003) (suggesting that the commonality of
procedural reform movements include: "(1) obvious defects in the existing procedural systems; (2)
agendas of the legal profession; (3) conservative ideology; and (4) liberal ideology"); Linda R. Singer, A
Pioneer's Perspective: Future Looks Bright, But Challenges Include Retaining Our Core Values, DiSP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 26-27 ("The [Pound] Conference coalesced the interests of those who
focused on access and participation or voice with those who focused on costs and efficiency. Those
interests have coexisted, somewhat uneasily, in the field ever since and have helped to shape the dispute
resolution profession that has grown up as a result.")
29. For example, the Center for Public Resources (CPR) was founded in 1979 with support from
private foundations and memberships of in-house and firm counsel of the country's largest companies.
CPR's mission is to promote innovation and excellence in methods of alternative dispute resolution.
Approximately 4000 companies (800 parent companies, on behalf of themselves and their combined
3200 subsidiaries) have subscribed to the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation,
obligating them to explore the use of ADR in disputes with other signers. Similarly, approximately
1,500 law firms have signed the CPR Law Firm Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation,
committing them to counsel their clients about ADR options. See http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2004).
30. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1, 47-48 (1987) (exploring the competitive aspects of the relationship between ADR and publicly
financed courts).
ADR was quickly viewed as part of the solution to many categories of cases. See, e.g., Ronald L.
Goldfarb & Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 314-17
(1970); Leffler, supra note 13, at 254; Andrew J. Nocas, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 13
FORUM 254 (1977); Comment, Nontraditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 49
TEMP. L.Q. 385 (1976); Haltzmann, supra note 13; Note, Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes: New
Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 309 (1976); Hardy supra note 13;
Matthew W. Finkin, The Arbitration of Faculty Status Disputes in Higher Education, 30 SMU L. REV.
389 (1976).
31. See, e.g., DEAN PRUITT & JEFFREY RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT (1986); CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION
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quixotic escape from all of that which plagued formal adjudication. 32 At
the time of Sander's speech there already existed a broad array of
proposed and experimental models of alternative dispute resolution.33
(1982); GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION (1981); HARRY T.
EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS
(1977); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM C. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981); P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
(1979); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR
DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996); Carrie Menkel Meadow, Review
Essay, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J.
905 (1983).
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979); E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 953 (1990); Steven Shavell, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995); Lee Ross, Reactive
Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 38-42
(Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1999).
Even law schools, until recent years, have provided little or no training in negotiation
skills. How strange! The lawyer's major revenue-producing activity is negotiating. Only
very recently have such courses begun to appear on the curriculum of even the best law
schools. Just this year, West Publishing Company added a casebook on the subject to its
American Casebook Series: The Lawyer as a Negotiator by Professor Harry T. Edwards
of Harvard and James J. White of Michigan (1977).
Robert Coulson, New Dimensions in Dispute Settlement for the Lawyer, in THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION'S WIDE WORLD OF ARBITRATION: AN ANTHOLOGY 188, 189 (Charlotte
Gold & Susan Mackenzie eds., 1978); Robert B. Moberly, Introduction: Dispute Resolution in the Law
School Curriculum: Opportunities and Challenges, 50 FLA. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1998) (suggesting that
almost all law schools offer at least one and often multiple courses in dispute resolution). Professor
Michael Moffitt at the University of Oregon School of Law maintains on behalf of the American Bar
Association Section of Dispute Resolution a list of the dispute resolution course offerings at all
American law schools. See http://www.law.uoregon.edu/aba/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
Today, of course, there are many excellent casebooks devoted exclusively to these fields of study.
See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL (2004); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5; ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (3rd ed. 2002); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2 (2d ed. abr. 1998); TRACHTE-HUBER & HUBER, supra note 24.
32. See, e.g., Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 834-
39 (1998) (arguing that increased use of mediation may elevate legal practice); see also Frances E.
McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted Summary), DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Summer 1997, at 12, 13; cf GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE:
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 1-10 (1965) (arguing that cultural factors
shape political institutions).
33. See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR: The Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, 2000 J.
DIsp. RESOL. 3, 4 ("Obviously, we didn't invent mediation, we didn't invent arbitration. But, by
common agreement, it was in about 1975 that the current interest in ADR began. The first period, I
think, was about 1975 to 1982. 1 call it, 'Let a thousand flowers bloom.' There were many
experiments .. "). ADR mechanisms then in practice included neighborhood justice centers,
rejuvenated small claims courts, arbitration, mediation, ombudsmen, and even reconceptualized state
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But Sander elevated these various methods of dispute resolution from
their shadowy adjunct and ancillary status to a legitimate alternative
primary process for the resolution of certain disputes.34 Charting a
spectrum of available processes from formal adjudication at one end
through mediation and negotiation at the other, Sander emphasized that
the critical issue was determining, for a particular conflict, the
"appropriate dispute resolution process." 35
Notwithstanding a vocal and persistent chorus of disquietude,36 ADR
has expanded to become somewhat of a court of general civil
jurisdiction.37 No longer a niche product for certain commercial and
and federal agencies. See Daniel McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A Review of Recent
Developments, in ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF
AN EMERGING IDEA 60, 64 (1982) (recounting how, in the 1960s, local communities established
neighborhood justice centers to provide facilitative dispute resolution services for neighbors, families,
tenants, and consumers); DANIEL MCGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (Nat'l Inst. L. Enforcement & Crim. Just. No. J-LEAA-030-76,
1977); DAVIS S. GOULD, NAT'L INST. FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, STAFF STUDIES ON SMALL CLAIMS
COURTS (1972) (documenting success of small claims courts); Thomas L. Eovaldi & Joan E. Gestrin,
Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 302-12 (1971) (discussing
arbitration and mediation of consumer claims); Mary Gardiner Jones & Barry B. Boyer, Improving the
Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
357 (1972) (same); Robert Wexler, Court-Ordered Consumer Arbitration, 28 ARB. J. 175 (1973)
(same); Maurice Rosenberg & Myra Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims
in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961) (same); Donald B. King, The Consumer Ombudsman, 79
COM. L.J. 355 (1974); Eric H. Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer
Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107 (1975); David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and
the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1968); NAT'L ASS'N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., COMM'N OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION 4-5 (1973); Rosenberg, supra note 9; Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a
Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
See generally TRACHTE-HUBER & HUBER, supra note 24 (suggesting that ADR is "not a new or even
recent development," and citing decision of King Solomon, Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, and use of
arbitration aid mediation to resolve trade and labor disputes). See also supra note 3 1.
34. Sander, supra note 21, at 80.
35. Id. at 84. Commentators have since adopted this appellation of the "ADR" acronym. See,
e.g., Albie M. Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way--We Earn It!, 4
NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 6 n.*; Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-
Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1999) (urging lawyers to engage in
"appropriate dispute resolution"); RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 51; Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases),
83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995) (urging that appropriate should replace alternative in describing
mediation and other nontrial dispute resolution processes). Of all the credit heaped upon Professor
Sander for his 1976 speech, I find it surprising that he has not also justly received the credit for
inventing the term "appropriate dispute resolution." In any event, upon my reading of the tea leaves and
the contemporary scholarship, it appears that "CDR" ("complementary dispute resolution") will be the
next label. See reference in PartV.C.
36. The bibliographies cited in infra n. 46 collect the relevant sources.
37. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92
Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (noting that arbitration has "moved from the role of commercial court to that
of a civil court of general jurisdiction"). See also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections
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labor law cases,38 ADR now commands attention in all sectors of the
economy 39 and in virtually every segment of society.
40
on the Triumph and Death ofAdjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 186 (2003) (suggesting that ADR
has "creat[ed] a 'new' civil procedure").
38. See, e.g., I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3 (1999);
Christine Lepera & Jeannie Costello, New Areas in ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 593, 610 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H-605, 1999). Employers are attracted to ADR for its facilitation of preventive
management. See, e.g., John E. Sands & Sam Margulies, ADR in Employment Law: The Concept of
Zero Litigation, N.J. LAW., Aug./Sept. 1993, at 23, 23-24 (discussing the fit between "new"
management structures and ADR in addressing employment-related conflicts).
39. In a 1997 Price Waterhouse survey of the "Fortune 1000" companies, nearly all of the 530
respondents had used some form of ADR, and ninety percent classified ADR as a "critical cost control
technique." Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite ": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded
Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998). For a detailed report on
corporate use of ADR, see David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate
Disputes, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 66,66-71 (1999).
A review of recent literature indicates the expansion of ADR in antitrust, see, e.g., Howard Adler, Jr.
& Richard Chernick, The Expanding Role of ADR in Antitrust Cases, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003,
at 34 (2003); entertainment, see, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment
Industry, 4 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (October 23, 2002); Gerald F. Phillips,
Entertainment Industry is Accepting ADR, 21 ENT. L. REP. 5 (1999); health care, see, e.g., Glenn Cohen,
Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making 1, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004);
Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating With an 800-Pound Gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 1417 (2003); John W. Cooley, A Dose of ADRfor the Health Care Industry, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 14
(2002); Bryan A. Lian, ADR in Health Care: An Overview of the ADR Landscape, in HEALTH CARE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL 3:1-3:43 (2000); natural resources, see, e.g., Eileen B. Vernon,
Arbitration in the Energy/Minerals Field: Customizing the Clause, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (2001); P. Jean
Baker, ADR Assists Energy Industry Restructuring, 54 DISp. RESOL. J. 8 (1999); intellectual property,
see, e.g., Manny D. Pokotilow, Why Alternative Dispute Resolution Should be Used for Intellectual
Property Disputes, 16 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17 (2004); Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer He
Can't Refuse: A Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes,
37 AKRON L. REV. 287 (2004); Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1998)
(arguing that ADR is an effective means of resolving disputes that involve "shared rights" and for which
an "either/or result in which one party walks away with all the rights at issue" is ill-suited); Eugene R.
Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Patent Litigation: A Survey of Patent
Litigators, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 84 (1999); and telecommunications, see, e.g., Lori
Tripoli, Telecommunications Act Offers Opportunity for ADR Advocates, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1997, at 3,
3 (reporting that the CPR Institute's Telecommunications Group is recommending ADR to state
agencies that must implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
Not surprisingly, certain growth areas have proven especially controversial. See, e.g., Clyde W.
Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform
Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759 (2001); Sidney
Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination Loophole: Using Title Vii's Anti-Retaliation Provision to
Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful Arbitration Agreements as Conditions of Continued
Employment, 76 WASH. L. REV. 957 (2001); Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and
Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right
to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
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ADR has clearly arrived in a big way. Many, if not most, federal and
state jurisdictions include ADR methods in their court rules. Federal and
state administrative agencies are increasingly relying on non-litigious
methods to resolve disputes. More and more, disputants are required to
use mediation or another form of ADR, rather than just being offered the
opportunity to use it if they so desire. Today, it is clear that far more
disputes in the United States are resolved through negotiation, mediation,
and arbitration than through trial. 4 '
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael D. Donovan & David A.
Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration
Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 19
(1999).
40. The Better Business Bureau, for example, may be the most familiar dispute resolution
program. See DONALD W. KING & KATHLEEN A. McEvoY, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE COMPLAINT-
HANDLING PROCEDURES USED BY CONSUMERS (1976) (Nat'l Technical Information Serv., U.S.
Commerce Dep't) (finding the Better Business Bureau more familiar to consumers than nineteen of
twenty-one public and private organizations; only the Post Office and the Social Security Administration
were better known). Trade associations and county, city, and state-sponsored consumer affairs offices
also often offer dispute resolution services. See generally Nader, supra note 12, at 1003-04 n.25.
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has formed special panels from time to time to deal
with particular phenomena: forming a claims resolution program at the request of the Florida
Department of Insurance following the devastation of southern Florida by Hurricane Andrew in 1992;
constituting a National Technology Panel in 1998 to address issues arising from the "Y2K Problem"
which then loomed as a potential threat; establishing in 2000 a panel for the USA Track and Field
doping arbitration program. AM. ARB. ASS'N, PUBLIC SERVICE AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
8-9, 130-31, (2004), available at www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1544. Other arbitration panels of general
interest may include the Tribunal Arbitral du Sport, which recently adjudicated the Olympic medal
controversy between gymnasts Paul Hamm and Yang Tae Young. See CA $2004/A/704 Yang Tae
Young v. Int'l Gymnastics Fed'n, at http//www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/yang.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
Perhaps the largest effort at private dispute resolution was the formation of the Asbestos Claims
Facility. This was an entity created with the assistance of Dean Emeritus Harry Wellington, on behalf of
manufacturers of asbestos and their insurers, to facilitate prompt disputes between and amlong producers
and insurers. See generally Harry Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem,
33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 14 n.56
(1991); Lieberman, supra note 24, at 438 (suggesting optimism at early stages of program).
For a range of other social applications of ADR, see, for example, T. Nikki Eckland, The Safe
Schools Act: Legal and ADR Responses to Violence in Schools, 31 URB. LAW. 309, 321-22 (1999);
Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When Fences Aren't Enough: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to
Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887 (2003); Scott E. Mollen,
Alternative Dispute Resolution of Condominium and Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 75
(1999).
41. Stemlight, supra note 24, at 290-91 (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-658, 652(a) (requiring each district court to have litigants in all civil cases consider using
ADR, and to provide at least one ADR process to litigants)); NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY PRACTICE app. B (1999 & Supp. 2000) (listing territory, state, and federal legislation on
mediation); Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 79 (listing federal
agencies utilizing various ADR processes, including the U.S. Postal Service, federal Justice Department,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Air Force).
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Facilitating ADR has, itself, become a cottage industry.42 And in
cyberspace, disputes are resolved through ADR 43 --even if we have yet
to appreciate fully what and where cyberspace is.44 The increasing
incidence of transnational disputes has likewise fueled the ADR boom.45
Reference to a system of ADR could be misleading in its simplicity
since there is, in fact, a constellation of different ADR mechanisms that
Arbitration is sweeping across the American legal landscape and is fundamentally
reshaping the manner in which disputes are resolved in our legal system. Simply stated,
arbitration is everywhere. Virtually all American businesses and individuals with legal
capacity to contract (and some who clearly lack such capacity) have entered into
agreements that specify arbitration as the forum for resolving most or all disputes that
might arise between the parties.
Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 497, 498
(2004).
42. A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.
219, 248 (1985); Sabatino, supra note 39, at 1301.
43. See generally Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25
(2004); COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS: B2B E-COMMERCE, CONSUMER,
EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE, AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS (2002); Frank A. Cona, Focus on
Cyberlaw: Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 975
(1997); Richard Michael Victorio, Internet Dispute Resolution (IDR): Bringing ADR into the 21st
Century, I PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 279 (2001); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace:
Demand for New Forms ofADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151
(2000); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolution: An Assessment of
Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003).
The Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution (CITDR) at the University of
Massachusetts supports and sustains the development of information technology applications as a means
for better understanding and managing conflict. As part of this effort they maintain a list of profit and
nonprofit ADR projects and ventures that provide online dispute resolution services. As of October 19,
2004, more than fifty projects were enumerated. See http://www.ombuds.org/center/onlineadr.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2004). See also http://www.odr.info/providers.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
44. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367 (1996); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002);
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439,
447-48 (2003).
45. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING N VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 33-62
(1996); First Global Research Facility Dedicated to ADR Launched, 54 DiSP. RESOL. J., 4, 4 (1999);
Betty Southard Murphy, ADR's Impact on International Commerce, 48 DISP. RESOL. J. 68, 69 (1993).
Because some foreign courts refuse to hear technology and Internet cases, ADR is the only recourse in
these situations. See Lepera & Costello, supra note 38, at 600. The New York Convention has also
made the enforcement of arbitration awards easier than foreign judgments. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(2006).
The availability of ADR has significantly improved international free trade climate because ADR is
more compatible with foreign biases against litigation. See generally L. Richard Freese, Jr. & Robert
Sagnola, New Challenges in International Commercial Disputes: ADR Under NAFTA, COLO. LAW.,
Sept. 1997, at 61, 62.
HeinOnline  -- 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 342 2005-2006
ADR." THE NEWEQUITY
can vary dramatically in form, substance, and purpose.4 6 Generally
speaking, however, this Article draws conclusions based on the
similarity of those mechanisms rather than their differences.47 The
important characteristic that they share is their departure from traditional
courtroom procedures.48 As Professor Resnik described in a similar
context, "I am interested in the interaction of two generic modes of
dispute resolution, one styled 'adjudication' and one styled 'alternative
dispute resolution' even as we know that both are constructs, with
internal distinctions, a variety of expressions, and a good deal of
overlap. ' ' 49  At this initial stage of argument, then, having simply
outlined the emergence of a system of ADR that is resolving and various
disputes is sufficient.
III. THE ECHOES OF EQUITY IN ADR
This Part draws attention to the characteristics of equity that inhere in
the system of ADR. To be sure, comparing two regimes as protean and
multi-dimensional as Equity and ADR without over-generalizing or
caricaturing either, and without cherry-picking the best analogues and
avoiding the complexities, can be difficult. This Part attempts to
minimize those risks by focusing on abstractions of the two systems
rather than on either system's constituent parts. For the most part these
abstractions also consider the systems of ADR and Equity in their pure,
original forms. 50  The observations made in this Part are purposely
46. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-5 (offering a useful table comparing and
contrasting various methods of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation, negotiation, private
judging, neutral expert fact-finding, minitrial, ombudsman, and summary jury trial); see also id. at 287-
94 (describing various innovative forms of arbitration, including final offer arbitration, high-low
arbitration, and mediation-arbitration ("med-arb")); id. at 303-04 (discussing early neutral evaluation).
For extensive bibliographies describing and evaluating the myriad processes and implications of
ADR, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 691-755, 761-82 (4th ed. 2003); RAU ET AL., supra note 31, at 1007-18.
47. Of course one should also note that the form, substance, and processes of "formal
adjudication" can also vary. Consider, for example, the differences between small claims court and the
United States Supreme Court. See Sander, supra note 21, at 69-70.
48. See generally Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 906 ("'Alternative dispute resolution' is a
label ascribed to an increasingly broad range of options that share few characteristics aside from their
common departure from traditional courtroom procedure.")
49. Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 256 (1995) (citing Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice
and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L. REV. 891, 895-96 (1993) (the "privatization continuum"); Marc
Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 12 STUD. IN. L. POL. & SOC'Y 393, 399-
400 (charting the "dimensions of privatization")).
50. Moreover, mining the history of Equity relies heavily on incomplete pictures painted by
secondary sources, making all conclusions somewhat tentative. See generally J.H. BAKER, THE LAW'S
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uncritical, if not somewhat superficial. A more thorough analysis of the
relationships between and among the systems of ADR and formal
adjudication on one hand and the systems of Law and Equity on the
other, follows in subsequent Parts. That later discussion also addresses
the evolution and perversion of these analogous "alternative" systems.
A. Locating a Jurisprudence
As a threshold matter, the word equity requires clarification. Indeed,
"[a]ll writers on the subject of equity seem to start their discussions in
agreement that the term is difficult to define." 51 There are at least three
definitions of equity and, to some extent, all three are relevant in a
comparison to ADR. One popular meaning of equity invokes a
collection of eternal and universal principles that captures all that which
is moral, right, just, and good.52 In the broadest understanding of this
view, equity is ethical rather than jural. 53 Grounded in the precepts of
the conscience, this notion of equity includes such mandates as
gratitude, kindness, and charity, and thus extends well beyond the reach
of positive law.54
A second, similar meaning sometimes given to equity makes equity
Two BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2001).
51. William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54 (1948). See also
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (1951) ("The
legal term 'equity' is generally acknowledged to be impossible to define completely."); Garrard Glenn
& Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945) ("There is
no definition of equity that will satisfy."); CHARLES E. HOGG, EQUITY PRINCIPLES 3 (1900) ("[T]o
attempt to define the powers and jurisdiction of a court of equity would only result in embarrassment
and confusion .... ).
52. See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle's Conception of "Equity" (Epieikeia), 18
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119 (1942-1943); MAx HAMBURGER, MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF
ARISTOTLE'S LEGAL THEORY (1965); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S
THEORY OF VIRTUE (1989).
Interestingly, this definition of equity has slowly fallen out of contemporary discourse. Compare
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1951) with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484-85 (5th ed. 1979);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1980); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579-80 (8th ed. 2004).
53. See generally NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (1895); PETER
C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 17-20 (1990)
(recounting history of equity).
54. See Colin P. Campbell, The Court of Equity-A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG
108, 110 (1903) (noting the intimacy of the relations among the basic principles of "equity, honesty,
generosity, and good conscience"). See generally JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 3-4 (1st American Edition from the 9th London Edition 1871); 1 LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEAS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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synonymous with "natural justice. 55 In this view equity "is the soul
and spirit of all law"56-the moral standard to which all law should
conform. 57 In this sense equity-the "real law" 58-has "a place in every
rational system of jurisprudence, if not in name, at least in substance. 59
A third, technical definition of Equity (a meaning typically signified
by use of the capital letter "E") refers to that system of jurisprudence
that was originally administered by the High Court of Chancery in
55. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 582 (1931)
("The most common of the non-technical meanings of equity, one in which lawyers themselves not
infrequently use the word, is as a synonym for 'natural justice."'); I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 34 (12th ed. 1877); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 8 (2d ed. 1892).
56. See JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, IS HIGHER LAW COMMON LAW? READINGS ON THE INFLUENCE OF
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 32-40 (1999); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 429 (University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1768).
57. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 66, at 68-70; SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 34
(E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1861) (defining Equity as "any body of rules existing by the side of the
original civil law, founded on distinct principles and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in
virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles"). See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
189 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1651).
58. Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 25 ("[T]he doctrines of equity
represent the real law, and when a Court of law insists on applying its own views as against the views of
equity, it is not getting at the real substantial rights of the parties.").
59. 1 STORY, supra note 55, § 7, at 6 n.4 ("1 FONBLANGUE EQUITY, B. 1, § 3, p.24, note (h);
PLOWDEN, COMM. p. 465, 466. Lord Bacon said in his Argument on the jurisdiction of the Marches,
there is no law under heaven which is not supplied with equity; for summum jus summa injuria; or as
some have it, summa lex summa crux. And, therefore, all nations have equity. 4 BAC. WORKS, p. 274.
Plowden, in his note to his Reports, dwells much (p. 465, 466) on the nature of equity in the
interpretation of statutes, saying, Ratio legis est anima legis. And it is a common maxim in the law of
England, that Apices juris non sunt jura BRANCH'S MAXIMS, p. 12; Co. LITT. 304(b).")
This definition of equity has led some to focus on the commonality of the foundational principles of
the common law and equity. Thus, Blackstone says: "[T]he [common] law is the perfection of reason, it
always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law. Not that the particular reason
of every rule in the law can at this distance of time be always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that
there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well
founded." I BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 70.
It is true that ... human legislation ought to conform itself to and embody these jural
precepts of the moral code; every legislator, whether he legislate in a Parliament or on the
judicial bench, ought to find the source and material of the rules he lays down in these
principles of morality; and it is certain that the progress toward a perfection of
development in every municipal law consists in its gradually throwing off what is
arbitrary, formal, and unjust, and its adopting instead those rules and doctrines which are
in agreement with the eternal principles of right and morality. But it is no less true that
until this work of legislation has been done, until the human law-giver has thus borrowed
the rules of morality, and embodied them into the municipal jurisprudence by giving
them a human sanction, morality is not binding upon the citizens of a state as a part of the
law of that state. In every existing municipal law belonging to a civilized nation, this
work of adaptation and incorporation has been performed to a greater or less degree.
I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 63, at 65-67.
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England.60  The circularity of this definition requires a brief narration of
the scope of the jurisprudence of Equity.
The system of Equity evolved from the royal prerogative of kings, as
the fountainhead of justice,6' to ensure that justice was administered in
each case.62 The chancellor, who functioned as a secretary to the king
and also as the keeper of the king's seal and "conscience," administered
60. GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 1 (1 lth ed. 1931) (1874) ("Equity is that system of
justice which was developed in and administered by the High Court of Chancery in England in the
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction."); Oleck, supra note 51, at 24 ("The description of equity as
that law which was administered by the old English courts of Chancery, of course, is hardly a definition.
Yet that is the customary introductory description of equity."). See also I POMEROY, supra note 55,
§ 67, at 70-71 (defining equity as "those doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies,
which the common law, by reason of its fixed methods and remedial system, was either unable or
inadequate in the regular course of its development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it
therefore either tacitly omitted or openly rejected"); MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY 9
(1879) ("[T]he jurisdiction of courts of chancery now extends to all civil cases proper, in good
conscience and honesty, for relief or aid, as to which the procedure of the common-law courts is
unsuited to give an adequate remedy, or as to which the common-law courts, when able to extend their
aid, have refused to do so."); CHARLES E. PHELPS, JURIDICAL EQUITY 192 (1894) ("By juridical equity is
meant a systematic appeal for relief from a cramped administration of defective laws to the disciplined
conscience of a competent magistrate, applying to the special circumstances of defined and limited
classes of civil cases the principles of natural justice, controlled in a measure as well by considerations
of public policy as by established precedent and by positive provisions of law."); I STORY, supra note
55, § 25, at 18 ("Equity jurisprudence may, therefore, properly be said to be that portion of remedial
justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of equity, as contradistinguished from that portion
of remedial justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of common law.").
61. "As the personal dignity of the king increased and the character of his relation to his people
was modified, his official powers were developed, and his function as fountain of justice became more
distinctly recognized." WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND § 72, at 27-28
(abridged ed., 1979). See also Oleck, supra note 51, at 33; George Burton Adams, The Origin of English
Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916); GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 91-93, 133
(1937); Campbell, supra note 54, at 109; Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law
Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934); see Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity-Why
They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 23 (1919-1920) ("It was the firm policy of the
Norman kings to concentrate all power within themselves .... "); I SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85-87 (1895); D.M. KERLY, AN
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 13-14 (1890). The operative
principle was that the king was the fountainhead of all justice, and in him, resided the final power to do
whatever was just and righteous. See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 17-19 (1952); WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69-70 (1923).
62. Until the latter part of the twelfth century, ordinary law and justice in England was governed
by custom and was administered rather informally (if not crudely) by the shire courts and the courts of
the hundred motes (in the time of Saxons and Danes, dating back to the seventh century) and by the
county, borough, and manor courts (in the early Norman period beginning with the Norman Conquest in
1066). The forms of trial were, in large part, appeals to the supernatural. See generally I POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 15-17; 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
40 (7th ed. 1956); GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (1948); Adams, supra note 61, at 91
(discussing the king's "prerogative machinery"); Frederick Pollock, English Law Before the Norman
Conquest, 14 L.Q. REV. 291, 297 (1898).
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the king's justice by issuing, at his discretion, brevia or writs
commanding the performance or cessation of certain acts.6 3  The
repeated issuance of writs based upon similar circumstances led to a
standardization of that process, such that the chancellor's court could
issue the appropriate writ whenever a complainant presented a certain
pattern of facts. 64 These writs became the foundation of the "Common
Law.",65  To the King's Court were added, in turn, the Court of the
Exchequer, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of the King's
Bench-all Common Law courts,6 6 and all approachable only upon the
authority of a writ issued by the Chancery.67
But the Common Law system became a hard and fast system with
certain clearly defined things that it could do and with equally clearly
defined things that it could not do.68 The universe of writs was fixed
63. See Adams, supra note 61, at 89 (discussing the new "judicial machinery" brought into
England at the Norman Conquest); Glenn & Redden, supra note 5 1, at 760 ("Justice did open the door[,]
of course, and it was the royal hand that was on the knob."); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY
AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: Two COURSES OF LECTURES 4-5 (A.H. Chaytor ed.,
1920).
64. This development is generally credited to Henry I1 (Curtmantle), who reigned 1154-1189.
See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 13 (4th ed. 2002); 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 138-46; WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 2 (1930).
65. See BAKER, supra note 64, at 49; WALSH, supra note 64, at 86-88; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 61, at 129-30; see also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW
PLEADING 18 (1969) ("Courts [were] organized to handle a series of specific cases, the decisions of
which gradually developed theories of rights and liabilities. In short, our rights and liabilities as defined
by Substantive Law, had their origin in and developed out of Procedural Law."). Of course, it bears
emphasis that the rights that were recognized were almost exclusively property rights; there were no
personal rights, political rights, civil rights as we understand them. See de Funiak, supra note 51, at 56.
66. Although each of these courts initially had its own proper sphere, these distinctions faded.
Generally speaking, plaintiffs had a choice between the three courts, and each of them dealt with the
case in the same way and by the same rules. These courts administered traditional law and statutes. The
phrase "common law" was borrowed from the canonists-who usedjus commune to denote the general
law of the Catholic Church. The common law refers to that part of the law that is unenacted and non-
statutory yet common to the whole land and to all Englishmen. It is contrasted with statute, local
custom, and the royal prerogative. When Chancery courts developed, common law would also be
contrasted with equity. See MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 2.
67. Oleck, supra note 51, at 35-36.
68. This statement requires some qualification. There is evidence that, in fact, the early "law
courts" of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries enjoyed and exercised considerable discretion in the
administration of what would later be called law and equity. Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the
New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REv. 244, 246 (1945); H.D. Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 261 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1913); William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation
of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor,
26 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1916) (accumulating evidence that common law judges in the twelfth through
fourteenth centuries "administered both law and equity"); Aaron Friedberg, The Merger of Law and
Equity, 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 317, 318 n.2 (1938) ("[D]uring the reign of Henry 11, both equity and
common law were administered under the same system of procedure and were quite undistinguishable
from each other."). The ossification soon followed, however. See Adams, supra note 61, at 96. See
also de Funiak, supra note 51, at 57 ("A growing worship of formalism and technicality also began to
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and their construction by Law judges narrowly circumscribed; 69 precise
and technical rules of pleading, procedure, and proof cabined judicial
discretion within the form of action. °70 Even for those who could
navigate the procedural minutiae successfully, the remedies available in
the Law courts were often wholly inadequate.
7
'
The ossification of the Common Law made it impossible for many
petitioners to obtain writs appropriate to their peculiar problems.
Without the appropriate writs, they could obtain no adequate redress
from the Common Law courts.7 2  Yet, there remained the royal
obsess the courts of law.").
69. For example, a provision in Magna Carta (1215) significantly diminished the scope of the
royal writ in respect to titles to land. Also, the Provisions of Oxford (1258) expressly forbade the
chancellor to issue any new writs "without the commandment of the King and his council who shall be
present." The Provisions were annulled five years later, but the common law courts nevertheless were
transformed during the 13th century into a rigid system of formal actions. See I HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 62, at 196; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 291; MILLAR, supra note 61, at 18 (citing FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION 41 (1936); quoting I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 58-
59 ("[Later], in the reign of Edward the First (1272-1307), Chancery was empowered to issue new writs
... to deal with new situations, [but] it met resistance from the common law courts which could, and
often did, throw out the writ as unlawful.")). This coincides with the development of the common law
courts into an institution that was separate from the king. See Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 246 (noting
independence of common law courts as of the fourteenth century); William Searle Holdsworth, The
Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REv. 293, 294 (1915) ("In the latter half of the fourteenth and in
the fifteenth centuries the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid system. It tended to be less
closely connected with the king, and therefore less connected with, and sometimes even opposed to, the
exercise of that royal discretion ....").
70. See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10,
10-11 (1926) ("In accordance with its technical mode of procedure, every species of legal wrong was
supposed to fit into some one of a limited number of classes; for each class an appropriate remedy was
provided, obtainable only by the use of some one of a limited number of 'forms of action.' An action
was begun by the issuance of a writ appropriate to the form of action; in time these writs became
standardized, and, where the facts of a case were without precedent, no writ to cover them was found,
and hence no action could be brought."); George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REv.
30, 31 (1924) (discussing "form-mad common-lawyers"); JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING'S
COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61-62 (1913) (referring to the common law's
"formulaic procedure"); Holdsworth, supra note 68, at 22 (discussing the "complicated machinery" of
the law courts).
71. See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17 (H.C. Merwin
ed., 1896) (discussing inability of common law courts to compel the performance of duties); Kittle,
supra note 61, at 28 ("[T]he remedies which the law courts gave were often wholly inadequate. They
were as bad as no remedy at all.").
We are thus faced with the startling view of a system of so-called jurisprudence that can
interpose only after a wrong has been done and is impotent to stay the hand of the
wrongdoer; which is powerless to compel men to perform their obligations and can only
give damages for their nonperformance; and which cannot take of or repair the mistakes
or omissions that so frequently arise in business affairs. In short, a system of
jurisprudence grossly imperfect and deficient.
de Funiak, supra note 5 1, at 57 (citing MERWIN, supra, at 17).
72. Oleck, supra note 51, at 36.
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prerogative; 73 this authority was exercised by the issuance of a writ of
subpoena-a summons to appear in Chancery.74 Chancery, which was
under the influence of ecclesiastical chancellors who had some
acquaintance with the cequitas of Roman law and also knowledge of
canon law, ushered in the next stage of development in English law. 75
The early ecclesiastical [c]hancellors thought that it was consistent with
belief in a revealed Word which stressed, among other things, a golden
rule, for them to translate moral and ethical rights into juridical rights,
enforced by the State, through its tribunals, when it was reasonable thus
to summon political sovereignty to the aid of morals, and when the
violation of such ethical rights involved proprietary consequences
affecting the common good. 76
By the late fourteenth century, a separate Court of Chancery
administered this jurisprudence.77
73. MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 3 ("Though these great courts of law have been established
[King's Bench, Common Pleas, etc.] there is still a reserve ofjustice in the king.").
74. See generally BAKER, supra note 64, at 103.
75. See Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834,
854 (1918); Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 312 (1933); Glenn & Redden,
supra note 51, at 760-61; Timothy Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST.
REV. 245 (1996).
76. Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke: Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319,
321 n. 10 (1936).
77. See Steele, supra note 70, at 11 ("[The] practice of referring to the Chancellor all of these
special appeals to the kind led to the establishment of a tribunal which by the time of Edward III (1327-
1377) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court, with its separate jurisdiction and mode
of procedure and its seat at Westminster."); Holdsworth, supra note 68, at 6 (describing that all cases
calling for equity were "handed over to a tribunal which, in time, came to be perfectly distinct from any
of the common law courts"); William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor's Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97,
107 (1929) (suggesting that Chancery as a court of equity was taking form "around the fourteenth
century"); Adams, supra note 61 at 97 (dating origins of a separate system of equity to the fourteenth
century); George Burton Adams, The Continuity of English Equity, 26 YALE L.J. 550, 556 n.17 (1917)
("The chancellor's court had become distinct from the Council before the end of the fifteenth century.");
I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 404 (suggesting that the chancellor first made a decree on his own
authority in 1474); Sevems, supra note 61, at 96 ("It is not until the end of the fifteenth century that
purely equity matters go to the chancellor alone."); Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth and Present
Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in England and the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 477 (1882) (quoting
the proclamation of Edward III addressed to the sheriffs of London "commanding them that, whatsoever
business relating as well to the common law of our kingdom, as our special grace, cognizable before us,
from henceforth to be prosecuted as followeth; viz., The common law business before the Archbishop of
Canterbury, elect, our chancellor, by him to be dispatched, and the other matters grantable by our special
grace be prosecuted before our special chancellor, or our well beloved clerk, the keeper of the privy seal,
so that they, or one of them, transmit to us such petitions of business which, without consulting us, they
cannot determine, together with their advice thereupon, without any further prosecution to be had before
use for the same."). In an effort to date the commencement of a court of chancery, it bears mention that
the earliest writers of the common law, such as Bracton, Glanville, Britton, and Fleta make no reference
to an equitable jurisdiction of a court of chancery. See also 10 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN
CHANCERY A.D. 1364 TO 1471 at xix (William Paley Baildon ed., 1896) ("It seems clear that the
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To minimize its conflict with the Common Law courts, which were
already ordained and established with judges and practitioners defensive
of their jurisdiction, 78 Chancery took as the basis of its jurisdiction the
maxim, cequitas agit in personam. 
79
[T]he decrees of a court of equity are to be regarded not so much as
decisions affecting the property or rights in dispute as in the light of
directions or commands, positive or negative, addressed to the individual
party or parties. The only method for their enforcement is by process of
contempt, under which the party failing to obey them is arrested and
imprisoned until he yields obedience ....
Thus by acting in personam, Chancery could administer complete relief
according to conscience and the principles of natural justice, without
reference to the Common Law or its courts.
81
The chancellor unrolled a vast body of legal principle to which we
now refer as Equity to offer relief in those cases where, because of the
technicality of procedure, defective methods of proof, and other
shortcomings in the Common Law, there was no "plain, adequate and
complete remedy" otherwise available. 82 In this context, plain was the
opposite of "doubtful and obscure." 83 A remedy was not adequate if it
"fell short of what the party was entitled to,"' 84 and a remedy that did not
"attain the full end and justice of the case" was not complete. 85
Chancellor had and exercised judicial functions of his own as early as the reign of Richard 11, if not of
Edward Ill."). See generally JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1828).
78. Smith, supra note 75, at 312.
79. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 11-12 (Erwin N. Griswold et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1956); MERWIN, supra note 71, §§ 130-142, at 72-79; GEORGE KEETON, INTRODUCTION TO
EQUITY 87-117 (6th ed. 1965).
80. FETTER, supra note 53, § 12, at 29.
81. Helmut Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law, 71 LAW
Q. REV. 223 (1955).
82. MILLAR, supra note 61, at 24; 1 STORY, supra note 55, § 33, at 22-23; GEORGE COOPER, A
TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 128-29 (1813); JOHN
FREEMAN MITFORD, TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH
BILL 112, 123 (George Jeremy ed., 1980); RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 214, 215 (T. Payne ed., 1792); MERWIN, supra note 71, at 17; Barbour, supra note
75, at 854; Severns, supra note 61, at 84.
83. 1 STORY, supra note 55, § 33, at 23 (citing Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johns. 587; King v.
Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384; Southampton Dock Co. v. Southampton H. & P. Board, L. R. 11 Eq. 254).
84. 1 STORY, supra note 55, § 33, at 23.
85. Id. § 33, at 23-24. "Where the remedy at law is adequate, but is involved in delay and is in
several respects inconvenient and circuitous, the cause will entertain jurisdiction in equity. Clouston v.
Sherer, 99 Mass. 209; Webb v. Ridgely, 3 Md. 364." Id. at 24 n.1. In addition to interfering when the
legal remedy was not plain, adequate or complete, Equity also interfered when the legal remedy was not
"certain," "prompt," "full, "practical "just," "final" or "efficient." See Thomas 0. Main, Traditional
Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 451-52 nn. 136-45 (2003) (collecting
cases).
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Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated the
moral sense of the community, existing as a function not only of a
community's technical rules, but also of "magisterial good sense,
unhampered by rule .... ,86 It was not a usurpation on the part of
Chancery for the purpose of acquiring and exercising power; rather, it
was an interposition to correct gross injustice and to address
circumstances that the static and rigid common law could not.87  There
was a strong tendency within the Law courts to sacrifice the particular to
the general, and to equate justice with certainty and uniformity. 88  The
function of Equity, then, was the correction of the Law where it was
deficient by reason of its universality. 89 "The regimes of law and equity
thus approached a given set of facts from opposite angles-invoking
distinctive traditions, applying different reasoning, and pursuing
separate aims."
90
The exercise of defining equity invites an immediate comparison to
ADR. ADR, too, is routinely noted as difficult to define. 91 Moreover,
definitions of ADR likewise range from the elaborate and theoretical to
the empirical and tautological. Among the most ambitious definitions,
ADR represents a complete restructuring of the adjudicatory framework
depicting a revolutionary and postmodern understanding of conflict,
truth, and justice.92 Yet the most common definition of ADR is a
86. Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 701-02 (1913).
87. Kittle, supra note 61, at 22.
88. The Common Law reflected the primary importance of certainty in the administration of the
law. Smith, supra note 75, at 310. Writs and forms of action created a determinate system that reflected
the influence of ancient institutions, the motives of policy, and a felt necessity for rules that regulated
those circumstances commonly present in typical human confrontations. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55,
§ 66, at 68-70. The system recognized a finite number of wrongs, and permitted no deviation from the
particular modes of procedure and proof.
89. See 1 STORY, supra note 55, at §§ 1-3 at 1-4 (discussing the original function of equity and
citing to writings on the nature of equity by Aristotle, Cicero, Justinian, Bracton, Grotius, and
Puffendorf).
90. See Main, supra note 85, at 444.
91. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at I n.2 ("Terminology and categorization are very
problematic in this field."); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument
that the Term "ADR " Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 97, 102 (noting that the
practitioners of ADR range from "pin stripes" to "Birkenstocks"); see also id. at 110 ("We should be
more self-conscious of grouping together techniques that may often merit separate analysis."). See also
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. And, of course, problems with terminology can, in turn,
create doctrinal and analytical challenges.
92. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-
Modern, Multi-Cultural World, I J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49, 49-53 (1996); THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE
STEEDS 4 (1989); BARUCH BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 7, at 2 (suggesting that ADR has "a unique
potential for transforming people-engendering moral growth-by helping them wrestle with difficult
circumstances and bridge human differences, in the very midst of conflict."); Joel B. Eisen, Are We
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functional one that, like Equity's reference to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery, 93 simply refers to the heterogeneous medley of
discrete ADR practices.
94
The systemic comparison runs still deeper. Both Equity and ADR
pre-existed their respective formal counterparts. 95  Both matured
incrementally and in reaction to those formal systems. 96 And the course
of that maturation in both systems was determined less by a priori
reasoning than by historical accident. 97 Courts of Equity exercised
jurisdiction if, but only if, the law courts failed to provide plain,
Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1305, 1322 (discussing "the transformative
and reconciliatory potential of ADR"). See also infra notes 353-60 and accompanying text. For
analogous definition of equity see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY
AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 19 (A.H. Chaytor ed., 1909) ("I do not think that any one has expounded or
ever will expound equity as a single, consistent system, an articulate body of law. It is a collection of
appendixes between which there is no very close connection."); Smith, supra note 75, at 315 (referring
to Equity as a set of "empirical remedies"--disconnected appendices or glosses to the common law in
particular areas).
94. See, e.g., Lieberman & Henry, supra note 24, at 425-26 ("ADR has never had a unified
theory to explain what it accomplishes and how it works.... It is easier to point to discrete practices
than to discern the entire direction of the new movement."); Douglas Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and
the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Considerations for Adoption and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 217 (2001) ("[ADR] is merely
a convenient, generic term encompassing a number of processes (some of which are radically different
from one another)... commonly understood to include alternatives to the formal adversary method of
trial or litigation. Thus, it includes negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and their variations."); Brunet,
supra note 30, at 10 ("A technical definition [of ADR] would list and describe the various mechanisms
now embraced as alternatives to a conventional trial .... ").
95. For a description of the ancient origins of ADR, see supra notes 7, 33, 58, and accompanying
text, and infra Parts VI and V. See also Resnik, supra note 49, at 213 (discussing "What came first?").
The roots of equity likewise run as deep as history can dig. See generally THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THUCYDIDES: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 164-66 (Richard Crawley trans., Random House 1951); 4 THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO 305, 324-25, 443-44 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford U. Press 1953); The Statesman, in
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 294a (Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); GEORGE
SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 325 (1846) (associating the royal
prerogative with sovereignty itself).
96. See infra notes 225-309 and accompanying text, and references to Parts IV and V.
97. Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal
Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130 (1942-1943) (referring to the separate systems of law and equity
as "accidents of history"). See also William Twining, Alternative to What?: Theories of Litigation,
Procedure and Dispute Settlement in Anglo-American Jurisprudence: Some Neglected Classics, 56
MOD. L. REV. 380, 380 (1993) (ADR movement was "largely pragmatic and political rather than
theoretical or 'scientific."').
See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 2 (discussing the development of a
.'jurisprudence' of ADR"); Resnik, supra note 49, at 222 (discussing the evolution and history of a "law
of ADR"). See also Twining, supra note 97, at 380 ("When a 'movement' relating to law develops in
the United States, one outcome is almost invariably a massive, confusing and largely unsystematic body
of literature of variable quality. The ADR movement is no exception.").
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adequate, and complete relief.98 Every order or rule administered in
Equity was born of some emergency, to meet some new condition that
was not otherwise remediable in the Common Law courts.99 Similarly,
alternatives to formal adjudication became necessary as that formal
system "became too expensive, too slow, and too inefficient to deal with
the myriad of problems it was being asked to resolve."'
00
B. Identifying Motives
A fundamental difference between the jurisdiction of Equity and the
jurisdiction of ADR is who makes the determination about whether the
case will be heard in the formal or, instead, the alternative system. In
Equity, the chancellor made that decision and thus set the limits of its
own jurisdiction. 10 In contrast, participation in ADR may be premised
upon the mutual agreement of the parties, whether such agreement was
reached before or after the dispute between them had arisen. 102 A court
or an authoritative mandate may also order litigants to engage in some
form of ADR.103  But whether the choice of legislators, litigants, or
judges, ADR has certain attractive characteristics that make it preferable
to formal adjudication in certain cases. These characteristics invite a
comparison between the systems of ADR and Equity because they
demonstrate the similarity-of the role that each alternative system plays
in the broader context of the administration of justice through dual
98. EDMUND H.T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 2-3 (1888); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 453 (3rd ed. 1922) ("To write fully of the equitable
jurisdiction of the Chancellor would be to write the history of equity itself.").
99. See I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 48, at 49 ("[E]very equitable rule which it announced, was
of necessity an innovation to a greater or less extent upon the then existing common law."); Holtzoff,
supra note 97, at 130 (history of equity).
100. Alderman, supra note 39, at 1238. See also Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 892-93 (1991) (chronicling how scholars,
legislators, judges and the bar hailed "ADR as efficient and effective procedural solutions to the
management problems associated with federal court civil litigation"); Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's
Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 360 (1990)
("Alternative dispute resolution is a response to criticisms of excessive litigation costs and systemic
insensitivity."). Accordingly, one might fairly conclude that ADR is resolving those cases where, in the
estimation of litigants who demand ADR or the authorities that impose ADR, formal adjudication fails
to provide a plain, adequate, and complete resolution of the dispute.
101. Steele, supra note 70, at 13 ("The process of delimiting the jurisdiction of chancery was
largely one of self-determination."); see also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
102. See generally RAU ET AL., supra note 31, at 545-96; Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated
Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV.
2079 (1993). Issues about the meaningfulness of a party's "consent" to ADR are discussed infra at
notes 419-35
103. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 388-415.
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systems.
The subsections that follow examine the keystones of the system of
ADR, and explore their medieval equitable analogues. A quote from the
ADR casebook authored by Professors Riskin and Westbrook provides
the organizational structure for this discussion:
Five motives, often intermingled, fire most of the current interest in
alternatives to traditional litigation: 1. Saving time and money, and
possibly rescuing the judicial system from an overload; 2. Having
"better" processes-more open, flexible and responsive to the unique
needs of the participants .... 3. Achieving "better" results-outcomes
that serve the real needs of the participants or society; 4. Enhancing
community involvement in the dispute resolution process; and 5.
Broadening access to "justice." 104
As explored in the sections that follow, each of these motives echoes a
theme that is characteristic of Equity.
1. Saving Time and Money
Rhetoric about the rampant costs and inefficiencies of formal
adjudication occupies a central role in the ADR canon.105
The common perception is that judges and lawyers, the procedural rigor
of justice and substantive incantations of legality, lay juries and technical
experts hurt more than they help. The recourse to legal actors and
proceedings is costly, emotionally debilitating, and potentially
counterproductive. 
106
"[T]he adversary system can be a hugely inefficient means of
104. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2. Another leading ADR casebook offers the
following list of "justifications" for ADR: (i) "To lower court caseloads and expenses;" (ii) "To reduce
the parties' expenses and time;" (iii) "To provide speedy settlement of those disputes that were
disruptive of the community or the lives of the parties' families;" (iv) "To improve public satisfaction
with the justice system;" (v) "To encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties' needs;" (vi) "To
increase voluntary compliance with resolutions;" (vii) "To restore the influence of neighborhood and
community values and the cohesiveness of communities;" (viii) "To provide accessible forums to people
with disputes;" and (ix) "To teach the public to try more effective processes than violence or litigation
for settling disputes." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8. Although I opted for the Riskin &
Westbrook framework for organizational purposes (finding less overlap in the enumerated factors), I
also refer occasionally to the Goldberg et al. factors.
105. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2 (a principal motive fueling ADR is "[slaving time
and money, and possibly rescuing the judicial system from an overload"). See also GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 8 ("To lower court caseloads and expenses; To reduce the parties' expenses and time, To
provide speedy settlement of those disputes that were disruptive of the community or the lives of the
parties' families"). See also supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
106. CARBONNEAU, supra note 92, at 1.
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uncovering facts; its relentless formalities and ceaseless opportunities
for splitting hairs are time consuming and expensive."' 0 7  Naturally,
these criticisms are often infused with crisis rhetoric about the litigation
explosion and overburdened courts.' 
08
By providing "a less legalistic process than litigation"10 9 the effective
use of ADR is thought to compare favorably with the acrimony, costs,
and time of ordinary litigation. 110
Promoters of ADR sometimes portray these techniques as offering a stark
contrast to the trial process. The dichotomy is viewed as absolute. "Bring
your dispute to another place," such proponents tell us, "and avoid the
burdens of our inefficient and antiquated trial system." ADR is seen by its
strongest advocates as informal and speedy; courts are viewed as rule-
bound and sluggish. "'1
And certain anecdotal evidence is enthusiastically confirmatory: "ADR
is far less expensive than litigation in resolving disputes, and that's
ultimately what litigation is all about. I think you can get to the heart of
the matter a lot quicker and ... with a lot less expense." 112
Equity, too, was "[s]imple, inexpensive and speedy in its origins."'" 13
Litigants came to Equity to avoid the gratuitous rigor, relentless
formalities, and tedious hair-splitting that epitomized formal
107. JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 171 (1981).
108. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text; Alvin B. Rubin et al., Colloquy on Complex
Litigation, 1981 BYU L. REv. 741, 747 ("[I]f more is not done to reduce the expense of litigation, the
legal profession will be destroyed."); Lambros, supra note 9, at 465 (growing workload demands on
courts "best relieved by diverting cases" to ADR techniques); Peckham, supra note 13, at 253; Chief
Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration to Relieve Courts of Litigation Burdens, 17 THIRD BRANCH 1,
1 (1985); Miller, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing "litigation explosion").
109. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 721 (1999). See also Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over
Attorney's Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REv. 2005, 2028 (1993) (there is "much less 'lawyering'
in arbitration than in litigation").
110. Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to
Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, 909 n.2 (2002). See also Maureen A.
Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for
Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 592 (2001) (calling the
ADR movement an "effort to avoid the delay, expense, technicality, and acrimony of traditional judicial
litigation"). For a discussion of contemporary empirical data about time and cost savings, see Parts IV
and V infra and accompanying text. In this Part III.B., however, ADR is contemplated in its pure,
original form(s).
111. Sabatino, supra note 39, at 1291.
112. John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation,
5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 177 (2000) (suggesting that this quote from the "general counsel of a
major manufacturing firm" was typical in his survey).
113. Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REv. 109, 112
(1934). A discussion of the eventual ossification of Equity procedure is reserved for infra Part IV.
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adjudication in the common law courts. 114  In Equity there were no
technical rules of pleading or procedure."15  Indeed, animated by the
juristic principles of discretion, natural justice, fairness, and good
conscience, the essence of a jurisprudence of equity is somewhat
inconsistent with the establishment of formal rules." 6 Equity's mandate
to do justice demanded that it be administered swiftly and
inexpensively. 117  Litigants did not need the representation of a
pleader. 118 Nor were litigants required to pay a filing fee." 9
The comparative advantage in "time and money" that both ADR and
Equity purported to offer as alternative systems was largely a function of
their "better processes" and "better results." That discussion follows
immediately in subsections 2 and 3.
2. Procedural Flexibility
Interest in ADR is also generated by the desire for processes that can
be tailored to the unique needs of a particular case.' 20  Proponents of
ADR argue that control or autonomy over issues of process may lead to
a more effective and satisfying resolution of the dispute.' 2 ' The ADR
narrative emphasizes that rigid procedural rules can be manipulated,
misused, and abused by gladiators fixated on purely adversarial
solutions. 122 The problem, they argue, is that lawyers are taught and are
114. See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
115. See Sevems, supra note 61, at 89 ("No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be
followed."); Walsh, supra note 77, at 106 ("Relief was given without a writ. The bill [in equity] was
generally in simple form, without formality, and free from the technical rules which applied to writs.");
Barbour, supra note 75, at 854 ("Less exactness of pleading was required than by the law, and even if a
bill were 'misconceived' the complaint was not out of court .... ").
116. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20,20 (1905). See generally
MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 12-22; JOH-N SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 1
(1893) (suggesting there is no body of rules for Equity); BALDWIN, supra note 70, at 64 (describing
Equity as a court "of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure").
117. BAKER, supra note 64, at 103-04.
118. Glenn & Redden, supra note 51, at 760 n.17.
119. Id.
120. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2. See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8
("To improve public satisfaction with the justice system ... to increase voluntary compliance with
resolutions.").
121. Freshman, supra note 110, at 909 (commenting that autonomy is a key value in ADR).
122. See, e.g., Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 929, 957 (2004) (referring to adjudication and ADR as "war
and diplomacy," respectively (citation omitted)); Robert F. Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and
(Very Brie]) Pragmatic Observations on Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution in America, 34
VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 366 (2000) (discussing the relative efficiency and efficacy of ADR in contrast to
"courtroom battles"); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Resolving Mass Tort Claims: The Perspective of a Special
Master, 53 DISp. RESOL. J. 10, 12 (1998) (contrasting ADR with the typical "protracted litigation war of
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encouraged
to exploit every loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their
opponents' tactical mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or
factual interpretation to favor their clients. The guiding premise of the
entire [adversarial] system is that maintaining the integrity of rights-
guarding procedures is more important than ... enforcing the substantive
law against its violators. 123
The formalized means for protecting rights are tricky, divisive, and time-
consuming, and can themselves become the barriers to the effective
redress of grievances. 124  In contrast, the relative informality of ADR
means that pre-trial procedures, elaborate pleading, motion practice, and
discovery can be modified, streamlined, or in many cases completely
eliminated to reach the merits of the dispute.' 25  ADR is thus a
procedural reform that restores the primacy of substance, casting
procedure as its mere handmaiden. 126 Of course, formal adjudication is
attrition"); Thomas R. McCoy, The Sophisticated Consumer's Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques: What You Should Expect (or Demand) From ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 975, 990
(1996) ("Mediation is not a spectator sport for the parties like litigation where lawyer-champions do
battle on behalf of their parties ...."); Richard A. Williamson, The Use of Experts Under the Amended
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in Alternative Dispute Resolution Forums, PLI Order No. H4-
5185 Mar.-Apr. 1994 at 414 ("Whereas litigation is war, Arbitration is a Skirmish, and Mediation, Early
Neutral Evaluation and similar informal non-binding ADR process can be likened to Powwows that may
lead to a lasting and satisfactory peace."). Of course whether disputants favor adversarialism is highly
disputed. See, e.g., Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65
VA. L. REV. 1401, 1420 (1979).
123. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988). See also
Nader & Singer, supra note 12, at 314-15 (1976) ("Law schools rarely teach the essential skills of
negotiation and mediation; rather their concentration on the dissection of appellate court cases
emphasizes the escalation of disputes rather than their prevention or early settlement. Heavy
dependence on the case method, with its focus on individual problems, makes unlikely any systematic
approach to resolving mass problems. The dearth of interdisciplinary study makes it difficult for
lawyers to perceive alternative ways of dealing with different types of existing disputes and those likely
to arise from emerging technologies.").
124. CARBONNEAU, supra note 92, at 1. See generally Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to
Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 938-
45 (discussing "scorched earth litigation" and "Rambo tactics" by litigators in a search of a competitive
advantage in high stakes litigation); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination
Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 289 (1994)
(suggesting that many formal court actions are extended unnecessarily by lawyers who exploit or abuse
judicial procedures, especially liberal rules for pretrial discovery); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2240 (1989) ("Discovery of documents in cases involving the conduct of business or government often
proceeds by a vicious game in which the respondent has every incentive to trim and cheat. Highly
developed dialectical skills have evolved."). See also Lieberman & Henry, supra note 24, at 427.
125. Rau, supra note 109, at 2027-28. See also Brunet, supra note 30, at 31-33 ("While various
ADR procedures permit some exchange of information between disputants, the process is informal,
ambiguous, and not administered in a managerial fashion.... [T]he spirit of ADR is antidiscovery.").
126. Brunet, supra note 30, at 31 (viewing ADR as procedural reform).
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thought to have experienced a similar conversion in favor of a flexible
and subservient procedural schemata. 127  Yet, ADR emerged as a
popular alternative to many because of its "'better' processes-more
open, flexible, and responsive to the unique needs of the participants." 1
28
These are familiar themes. The Law courts were notorious for their
idolatry of form and forms. 129  Complex, unforgiving, and formulaic
rules of pleading, procedure, and proof could be navigated successfully
only by the "form-mad common-lawyers."' 30  A failure to purchase the
correct writ or to comply with minor technical requirements was an
incurable mistake. 13 1 The rigors of single issue pleading, too, tolerated
not even the slightest misjudgment.' 32 The entire fate of a lawsuit could
turn upon the exact words that the parties uttered when they appeared
before the tribunal: "The client was unthought of.... The right was
nothing, the mode of stating, everything."'
133
If a wrong action was adopted, the error was fatal to the whole
proceeding, however clearly the facts of the controversy might have been
brought before the proper court.... It was not enough that he stood
127. See Subrin, supra note 14.
128. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2.
129. de Funiak, supra note 51, at 57 ("A growing worship of formalism and technicality also
began to obsess the courts of law."); Garrett, supra note 70, at 35 ("[T]he Common Law has brought
about its own downfall by its idolatry of the forms it created.").
130. Id. at 31 (discussing "form-mad common-lawyers"). See also Adams, supra note 61, at 96
(explaining the Law courts' "hard and fast system"); BALDWIN, supra note 70, at 62 (referring to the
common law's "formulaic procedure"); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 447 (discussing the "complicated machinery" of the Law Courts).
131. KOFFLER, supra note 65, at 39 ("When the plaintiff petitioned the Chancellor for an Original
Writ, he was under great pressure to select the right Writ for the facts of his case.... If he selected a
Form of Writ which did not fit his case... he could not succeed.").
132. The common law pleadings rules earned the dubious distinction as "the most exact, if not the
most occult, of the sciences." 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 612. There are three
fundamental rules to single-issue pleading. First, after a declaration, the parties must at each stage (i)
demur; (ii) plead by way of traverse; or (iii) plead by way of confession and avoidance. Second, upon a
traverse, issue must be tendered. And third, the issue, when well tendered, must be accepted. Either by
virtue of the first rule, a demurrer takes place which is a tender of an issue in law, or, by the joint
operation of the first two rules, the tender of an issue in fact. And then, by virtue of the second and third
rules, the issue so tendered, whether in fact or in law, is accepted and becomes finally complete. It is by
these rules that the production of an issue is effected. See generally HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES
OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 136 (2d ed. 1901). Encyclopedic volumes of supplemental rules and
principles ensure the production of an issue that is truly but one issue, see, e.g., id. §§ 137-169, 164-
339, that is material, see, e.g., id. §§ 170-174, 340-345, and is unified, see, e.g., §§ 175-190, 346-371,
and is certain, see, e.g., id. §§ 191-228, 372-430, and is neither obscure nor confusing, see, e.g., §§
229-243, 431-452, and will lead to neither prolixity nor delay in pleading, see, e.g., §§ 244-249, 453-
465. See also id. §§ 250-259, 466-481 ("Certain Miscellaneous Rules"); R. ROSS PERRY, COMMON-
LAW PLEADING 231-81 (1897) (discussing the rules and mechanics of issue pleading).
133. Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, 37 CONTEMP. REV.
797, 800 (1890). See also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 559.
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within the temple of justice, he must have entered through a particular
door. 1
34
This pathways-to-justice metaphor (although evocative of Sander's
"multi-door courthouse" 135) may be deceptively pacific. Other
commentators used battle metaphors to express the stakes and the
intricate terms of engagement.' 36  By all accounts, the process was a
contest of skill, and success depended upon observing the formal rules
of the combat.' 37 Here, too, lawyers and legal education were blamed
for the excesses of adversarialism and formalism. 1
38
In the Law courts, "truth was quite unable to force its way through the
barriers erected against its opposite."' 
39
The Common Law made a fetich of procedure. Obviously, this was to
134. CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND
ENGLAND 47-48 (1897).
135. Sander, supra note 21, at 84 ("The room directory in the lobby of such a [Dispute
Resolution] Center might looks as follows: Screening Clerk-Room 1; Mediation-Room 2;
Arbitration-Room 3 ...."). See generally Resnik, supra note 49, at 217 (discussing Sander's
metaphor). See also Stempel, supra note 5, at 348 (discussing the importance of the procedural justice
metaphors).
136. [The system of common law forms of action] contains every weapon of medieval warfare
from the two handed sword to the poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes
thither to choose his weapon. The choice is large; but he must remember that he will not be able
to change weapons in the middle of the combat and also that every weapon has its proper use and
may put to none other. If he selects a sword, he must observe the rules of sword-play; he must
not try to use his cross-bow as a mace.
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 559. Sport metaphors are also popular. In fact, the Roscoe
Pound speech that served as the rallying cry for Chief Justice Burger's Pound Conference in 1976 (the
birth of the modem ADR movement) was itself a plea for equity. Roscoe Pound referred to the "sporting
theory of justice" when criticizing the rigidity of common law pleading. Roscoe Pound, The Canons of
Procedural Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926). Arguing in 1906 for a more equity-based procedure,
Pound criticized the sporting theory on the ground that it led to deciding cases "according to the rules of
the game" rather than in accordance with a "search independently for truth and justice." Roscoe Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738
(1906). For a discussion of the importance of metaphors generally, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 225 (1995).
137. HEPBURN, supra note 134, at 48 ("The issue of the combat must not be determined by mere
brute force-not even by the brute force of indisputable facts arrayed before the court.").
138. For a discussion of how form was the focus of both the practice and the study of the Law, see
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 380-81 (5th ed. 1956)
(discussing efforts of Glanville, Bracton, and Littleton.); BAKER, supra note 64, at 49-52; S.F.C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 59 (2d ed. 1981) (explaining that procedure
dicatated how the law existed and how lawyers thought); KOFFLER & REPPY, supra note 65, at 65
(stating that "[t]he Law was required to express itself through the Limited System of Writs and Forms of
Action sanctioned by precedent"). HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND
CUSTOM 389 (1883) (noting that common lawyers could see the law "only through the envelope of its
technical forms").
139. Coleridge, supra note 133, at 798.
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put the cart before the horse. In any satisfactory system of law, procedure
must always remain a means, not an end. It must always be subordinate
to the purpose of the process, which is to right wrong. Glanville, and
Bracton, and Littleton, and Coke forgot this. They became so interested
in forms that they allowed the substance to escape.
With neither forms of action nor technical pleading rules, Equity
focused instead on the merits of the dispute.1 41 Although "form" is not
itself a pejorative, 142 one could fairly conclude that "law deal[t] with
form, equity with substance."' 143  Chancery "had the power to look
140. Garrett, supra note 70, at 31.
141. Oleck, supra note 51, at 40 ("[T]he plaintiff set forth his cause in a 'bill.' Then the
chancellor would issue a 'subpoena,' in the king's name, to summon the opposing party, who could
demur, enter a plea, or file an 'answer."').
No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed. The difference from
proceedings on writs is significant. It may be said that all that was necessary was to state
sufficient facts to show a reason for granting relief Indeed it appears that if a bill did not
state sufficient facts, permission was granted by the Justice to amend viva voce, a
procedure which would not have been tolerated at Westminster.
Sevems, supra note 61, at 89.
In the equity procedure one encounters no bewildering rules as to the name or
classification of the particular suit, or, according to the nomenclature at law, "form of
action." When from an investigation of the law and facts, counsel has determined that
the client has a good cause for equitable relief, he is saved the problem of wasting brain-
sweat in deciding whether he shall sue in debt, assumpsit, or covenant, in trover or
replevin, in trespass vi et armis or trespass on the case. He simply decides to file a "bill
in equity."
EDWIN B. MEADE, LILE'S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 94, at 59 (3d ed. 1952). See generally
Main, supra note 85, at 457-58.
142. The science of special pleading is an excellent logic; it is admirably calculated for the
purposes of analyzing a cause, of extracting, like the roots of an equation, the true points in
dispute, and referring them with all imaginable distinctness to the court or jury. It is reducible to
the strictest rules of pure dialectics, and tends to fix the attention, give a habit of reasoning
clearly, quicken the apprehension and invigorate the understanding.
Sir William Jones' Works. Prefatory Discourse to the Speeches of Isaus, IV. 34. (f.) IX. 50, 51 (8 vo.).
See also Robinson v. Rayley, I Burr., at 319 (Mansfield, J.) ("[T]he substantial rules of pleading are
founded in strong sense and the soundest and closest logic.").
One of the best qualities of our medieval law was that in theory it left little or nothing at
all events within the sphere of procedure, to the discretion of the justices. They
themselves desired that this should be so and took care that it was or seemed to be so.
They would be responsible for nothing beyond an application of iron rules.
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 561. See also id. ("Had they aimed at a different end, they
would have 'received' the plausibly reasonable system of procedure which the civilians and canonists
were constructing, and then the whole stream of our legal history would have been turned into a new
channel. For good and ill they made their choice.") For analogous apologies of formal adjudication, see
STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984); A. STRICK,
INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977); J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-142 (1949).
143. Edward Robeson Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1917).
HeinOnline  -- 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 360 2005-2006
ADR: THE NEWEQUITY
beyond the form to the substance and may lend his power in aid of a
person wronged to see that the wrong does not go without a remedy."'"
The administration of Equity presumed procedural flexibility. 1
45
This flexibility extended, of course, to an array of remedies that were
simply unavailable under the Common Law. With "practically an
unlimited power of enforcement," Equity could adapt its decree to all
circumstances arising in a case, "and adjust at one stroke the various
interests of all parties concerned."' 146 Whether requiring the specific
performance of contracts, enjoining the repetition of a trespass or
nuisance, appointing a receiver to prevent a defendant from destroying
property that was the subject of an action, or ordering an accounting,
Equity could tailor its remedies to meet the real and substantial rights of
all the parties in the circumstances then presented. 147
Much like the Law courts, formal adjudication is bound by the
"limited remedial imagination of courts" and to binary win-lose
results. 148
A formalist, rule-bound institution is ill equipped to recognize what is
really at stake in its conflicts with the environment. It is likely to adopt
opportunistically because it lacks criteria for rational reconstruction of
outmoded or inappropriate policies.... The idea of legality needs to be
conceived more generally and to be cured of formalism.
Proponents of ADR argue that rigid adherence to legal formulae can
frame debates in a zero-sum model that obscures parties' goals and
overlooks a richer set of possible resolutions. 150
144. Severns, supra note 61, at 90.
145. See MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 12-22; JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 1-5 (13th ed.
1906) (suggesting that the true and original distinction between law and equity is one not between two
conflicting bodies of rules, but between a system of judicial administration based on fixed rules and a
competing system governed solely by judicial discretion); BALDWIN, supra note 70, at 64 (referring to
equity as a court "of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure").
146. Steele, supra note 70, at 14.
147. See MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 4-7; Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years ofAmerican Equity,
50 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1936); 1 STORY, supra note 55, § 27, at 19; MITFORD, supra note 82; 1
WOODDESON, supra note 82, at 203-06.
148. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 7, 18 n.77 ("[But] of course not all judgments are binary
or rigid formulations of damages and injunctions. There are "compromise verdicts," comparative
negligence considerations, and all kinds of equitable relief. There is also the more complex kin of ruling
in a wide variety of law reform, institutional, and public law cases." (citing Chayes, supra note 28;
Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93
HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980))). See also Hensler, supra note 13, at 182.
149. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 77, 108 (1978).
150. Resnik, supra note 49, at 252; RAIFFA, supra note 31, at 33-35; JAY FOLBERG & ALISON
TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10
(1984); Lieberman & Henry, supra note 24, at 425, 529; Hensler, supra note 13, at 182.
2005]
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Like Equity, ADR does not restrict the parties to discrete legal claims
or preexisting legal remedies; therefore a variety of creative remedies
are available:
ADR is more flexible and adapts to the specific needs and demands
of the case. With ADR the parties can utilize creative remedies and
a broader range of solutions. Because the courts use a relatively
structured approach, the range of remedies available may be quite
limited. Lawyers may be required to reframe the issues so as to fit a
particular legal doctrine and, thus, may change the nature of the
dispute. As a result, the court often is not able to address the real
issues and tailor an appropriate remedy. 151
ADR is thus especially appropriate in cases where "the nature of the
dispute requires a broader range of remedies and a broader focus on the
issues than the courts can provide."' 152 ADR can order monetary and
injunctive remedies to promote certain behavior, restructure
relationships, and impose outcomes beyond the legal and practical reach
of courts. 1
53
The remaining paragraphs of this subsection address particular
procedural characteristics that may contribute to the popularity of ADR.
One of these characteristics is the ability to keep ADR proceedings
151. Robert B. Moberly & Judith Kilpatrick, Introduction: The Arkansas Law Review Symposium
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167 (2001). See also Jennie Kihnley,
Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints,
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 71-72 (2000) ("The parties can attain 'extralegal justice' due to the
flexibility of ADR, which allows for a wider range of problems and remedies than litigation." (citing
Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497, 503 (1993))); E. PATRICK
MCDERMOTT & ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE:
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES EXECUTIVES AND THEIR COUNSEL (1996));
EDWARD J. BERGMAN & JOHN G. BICKERMAN, COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1998) (suggesting that creative solutions, illustrated by
remedies that few courts would grant, are the most common characteristics of successful alternative
dispute resolution); Edward J. Costello, Jr., ADR: Virtue or Vice, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 65 (1999)
("Even in adjudicative ADR, the neutral has much broader authority to craft a remedy than a judge, so
long as it has an appropriate nexus to the underlying agreement to arbitrate."); JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI, THE
LAWYER'S CALLING 94 (1996) (discussing creative alternative dispute resolutions, including Christian
conciliation centers in which Christians can being their disputes in order to obtain nonlegal remedies.);
Edwin B. Wainscott & Douglas W. Holly, Zlaket Rules and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 481
PLI/LIT. 631, 638 (1993) ("Unlike litigation, ADR does not restrict the parties to discreet legal claims or
pre-existing legal remedies, and therefore, a variety of creative remedies are available. The type of
procedures that may be agreed upon are limited only by parties' and their counsels' imagination.");
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S5-
S7(1989).
152. Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
337, 340 (1990).
153. Lande, supra note 112, at 150. See generally supra note 128 and accompanying text.
362
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private. 154 Unlike formal adjudication, pleadings (if any) need not be
publicly filed; hearings can occur in a private conference room and are
neither known nor available to the public;1 55  there may exist no
transcript; and even the decision need not be released to anyone other
than the interested parties.156 Confidentiality can be maintained and
publicity can be avoided in cases involving trade secrets or other
confidential or embarrassing information. 157 By way of analogy, the
informality and flexibility of Equity made those proceedings similarly
"private," at least in certain respects. For example, in early Equity many
proceedings were initiated not by a recorded bill, but by word of
mouth. 158 And because there was no notion of precedent in early Equity,
the reporting of Chancery proceedings was sporadic and largely
unnecessary. 159 Moreover, Chancery "could sit anywhere, even in the
154. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLJM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961); Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court Annexed
Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2240-41 (1993); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court
Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 54 (1996); Costello, supra
note 151; Robert F. Blomquist, Is Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution Working in America?,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,661, 10,666 (2000).
155. STEVEN C. BENNETr, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 7 (2002). Richard S. Bayer &
Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, LITIGATION, Winter 1985, at 30, 31 ("Often the
room is a hotel suite sporting masonite folding tables positioned in an inverted "'U.'" There is no gavel
or bailiff, no robed figure sitting above the proceeding. Rather, there are one to three businessmen,
seated comfortably at the top of the 'U,"' chatting informally with the parties."). See also Resnik, supra
note 49, at 248-49 (discussing the ADR empowerment thesis in the context of the informality of those
proceedings).
156. Ware, supra note 109, at 721-23.
157. See generally Blackman & McNeill, supra note 39, at 1722 (stating that "public disclosure of
confidential trade secrets or other proprietary information can more easily be avoided in an ADR
proceeding if the parties so choose"); Kevin R. Casey, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3
FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (1993) ("ADR hearings usually do not yield transcripts or written opinions in which
trade secrets or other confidential information may be compromised (or in which 'dirty linen' of a loss is
aired)."); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 538
(1986) ("[M]any defendants (and their attorneys) in products liability and antitrust cases ... now seem
intrigued by ADR as a means of protecting themselves from negative publicity and from outcomes they
have disliked."); Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial
Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 208 (2000).
158. See BAKER, supra note 64, at 103.
159. See Glenn & Redden, supra note 51, at 763 (noting that "there were no regular reports of the
cases that were decided"); Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 How. 127, 193 (1844) (Story, J.) (stating that equity
decisions had no precedential effect because the rulings were contained in reports that were "shadowy,
obscure and flickering").
Bacon's desire to systematize the practice of the Court of Chancery is also illustrated by
his plea for equity law reports, contained in his "Proposition touching the Compiling and
Amendment of the Laws of England" addressed to James I during his attorney-
generalship. In it he pays a rare tribute to Coke, when he observes that but for the reports
of the great chief justice "the law by this time had been almost like a ship without
ballast," and he urges the sovereign to appoint "grave and sound lawyers" to be paid
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chancellor's private house."'1 60 Of course, both ADR and Equity have
suffered criticism for this informality and secrecy.' 
61
An expert decisionmaker is another component of the procedural
flexibility that makes ADR attractive.' 62 Juries are often perceived as
ignorant and unpredictable factfinders.' 63 Litigants thus may wish to
avoid a jury trial in favor of a neutral, and perhaps a neutral with
technical expertise. 64 Equity procedure is analogous because there were
no juries. 165 The chancellor assumed the role of judge and jury, and
reporters in the courts. This suggestion bore fruit in 1617, for on October 20th (only a
few months after Bacon had assumed office), the "Ordinance for the Constitution of the
Reporters of the Law" was issued, two reporters, with a salary of £100 a year each being
appointed. The size of the salary, unusual in those days, may be taken as an indication of
the importance that Bacon attached to law reporting.
George W. Keeton, Bacon as a Chancery Judge, 18 IOWA L. REV. 476, 477-78 (1933).
160. See BAKER, supra note 64, at 103.
161. See Brunet, supra note 30, at 28 (noting that "the absence of records and of written opinions
make the pathology of ADR difficult"). In Equity the criticism was part of an attack on the overall
arbitrariness of the system. See, e.g., JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK 64 (1989) ("Equity is a roguish
thing. For law we have a measure... equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor,
and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. Tis all one has if they should make the standard for the
measure a Chancellor's foot."); 6 BULSTRODE WHITELOCK, COMMONS JOURNALS 373 (1650) ("The
proceedings in Chancery are secundum arbitrium boni viri, and this arbitrium differeth as much in
several men as their countenances differ. That which is right in one man's eyes is wrong in another's.");
Severns, supra note 61, at 82 (mocking the jurisprudence of equity as "some sort of Philosopher's Stone
by which injustice is whisked into justice by the simple method of preparing a form of petition lately
called a 'bill').
162. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385 (1992);
Stephen Meili & Tamara Packard, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a New Healthcare System: Will it
Workfor Everyone?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 23 (1994); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized
Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 208 (1996) (surveying potential
benefits of arbitration).
163. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 186 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930) (stating
that juries are uncertain, capricious and unpredictable); id. at 191 (stating that juries are ignorant and
prejudicial); id. at 192-94 (stating that juries are poor fact-finders); id. at 197 (stating that juries are
incapable of following complex legal rules). See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NElL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY (1986); STEPHEN SUBRIN, MARTHA MtNOW, MARK BRODIN & THOMAS MAIN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 377-89 (2d ed. 2004) (collecting materials
evaluating juries).
164. Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is there a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution,
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 189 (1991) (suggesting that the use of expert adjudication may be the
"main appeal of private arbitration").
165. [Common law courts] proceed to the trial of contested facts by means of a jury; and the
evidence is generally to be drawn, not from the parties, but from third persons, who are
disinterested witnesses. But courts of equity try causes without a jury; and they address
themselves to the conscience of the defendant, and require him to answer upon his oath the
matters of fact stated in the bill, if they are within his knowledge; and he is compellable to give a
full account of all such facts, with all their circumstances, without evasion, or equivocation; and
the testimony of other witnesses also may be taken to confirm, or to refute, the facts s9 alleged.
Indeed, every bill in equity may be said to be, in some sense, a bill of discovery, since it asks for
the personal oath of the defendant, to purge himself in regard to the transactions stated in the bill.
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decided both the factual and legal issues. 166 And to the extent that the
jurisprudence of Equity was but the jurisprudence of conscience, 167 the
chancellor, often a trained ecclesiastic, was undoubtedly an "expert."
68
The finality of a win or a loss and the avoidance of an expensive and
time-consuming appellate process are other claimed advantages of the
procedural flexibility of ADR. 169 Further, as a result of the Federal
Arbitration Act, and equivalent state statutes and international treaties,
arbitration awards can be even easier than traditional judgments to
enforce. 170 Again there is an equitable analogue: in Equity, relief was
enforced at once and under the threat of contempt. 171 Moreover, until the
seventeenth century, there were no appeals from Chancery.1
72
Finally, part of the allure of ADR may also be that system's ability to
alter the procedure to identify a procedurally neutral site. Formal
adjudication tends to locate the suit in the "home" court of one party or
the other. Because both sides have the same home court instinct, in
certain circumstances the only neutral forum on which they may agree is
ADR. 173 This issue often arises in international disputes, where ADR is
especially popular. 174 Here the analogy from Equity is imperfect. Equity
courts "could sit anywhere,"' 175 but we have no reason to believe that the
Chancellor opted for a neutral site.
It may readily be perceived, how very important this process of discovery may be, when we
consider how great the mass of human transactions is, in which there are no other witnesses, or
persons, having knowledge thereof, except the parties themselves.
I STORY, supra note 55, § 31, at 21.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
169. Casey, supra note 157, at 5; Ware, supra note 109, at 722-23.
170. Id.
171. BAKER, supra note 64, at 104 ("[D]efendants could not easily evade this new and powerful
justice; for contumacy they could be imprisoned, or their property sequestered.").
172. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 935-36
(1997) (noting that "in 1675, the House of Lords accepted jurisdiction over 'appeals in equity' from
Chancery"). See also JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 26 (1971) (suggesting that the colonial appeal could not
"have been in imitation of the English Chancery appeal, for this was still, so to speak, in vetre sa mere
when the first American enactments were put on the books"). See generally Benjamin Goldman, The
Scope of Review and Requests for Rulings in Equity Suits, 23 B.U. L. REv. 66 (1943). Cf Bilder, supra,
at 927 (explaining a horizontal system of mutual review by peer courts).
173. See Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause-Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 AM.
Bus. L.J. 575, 581 (1988).
174. See supra note 45. See also Andrew Sagartz, Note, Resolution of International Commercial
Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675
(1998).
175. See BAKER, supra note 64, at 103.
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3. Substantive Flexibility
In formal adjudication, the judge is obliged, of course, to follow the
substantive law. 176 Although the substantive law undoubtedly casts its
"shadow" on ADR processes, 177 we may be skeptical of the significance
of shadows. 178 In the more voluntary and less structured forms of ADR,
such as mediation, where the ultimate authority belongs to the
participants themselves, the parties (perhaps with the benefit of a third
party facilitator) can fashion a unique solution that will work for them
without being strictly governed by precedent.179  Thus, mediators "do
not 'judge'; they aid the parties in ending a dispute."' 180 ADR is
attractive to some, then, because of the system's promise of "better"
results that serve "the real needs of the participants or society." 181 These
results may or may not "follow the law," and it arguably does not matter
because of the parties' voluntary acquiescence to the resolution.
In those forms of ADR that more closely resemble formal
adjudication, such as binding arbitration, ADR's relationship with the
substantive law becomes much more nuanced. On one hand, judges
regard arbitration clauses as "forum selection clause[s],"'' 1 2  and hold
that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute."' 183  Put another way,
176. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn 't; When Do We Kiss
It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 313-75 (2d ed. 1996); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 69-70; BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-21 (1921); Roscoe Pound, Remarks On Status of the Rule of
Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CN. L. REV. 324, 328-32 (1940).
177. See Mnookin, supra note 27.
178. PLATO, REPUBLIC 514A-521C (referencing Plato's famous allegory about the prisoners in the
cave). See generally Thomas 0. Main, "An Overwhelming Question " About Non-Formal Procedure, 3
NEV. L.J. 388, 397-98 (Winter 2002/2003).
179. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 150, at 10.
180. Brunet, supra note 30, at 26.
181. RISKIN & WESTRBOOK, supra note 31, at 2. See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8
("To encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties' needs;... To restore the influence of
neighborhood and community values and the cohesiveness of communities.").
182. See Lee H. Rosenthal, ADR: One Judge's Perspective on Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 669, 672 (2005).
183. The Court conceives of arbitration clauses as forum-selection clauses, but not as choice-
of-law clauses. In the Court's view then, an arbitration clause specifies the procedural law to be
used in resolving a dispute, but not the substantive law to be used. With respect to substantive
law, Mitsubishi indicates that arbitrators must apply the same substantive law a court would
apply. Similarly, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon [482 U.S. 220 (1987)], the
Court held that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable because "although
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." [Id. at 232.] The Court often says
that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
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courts insist that arbitrators "follow the law."' 84 Yet on the other hand,
we also anticipate, if not desire a certain amount of deviation from the
law in arbitration:
Soia Mentschikoff s seminal survey of arbitrators found that eighty
percent of the studied commercial arbitrators "thought that they ought to
reach their decisions within the context of the principles of substantive
rules of law, but almost ninety percent believed that they were free to
ignore these rules whenever they thought that more just decisions would
be reached by so doing." A more recent survey of construction arbitrators
found that twenty-eight percent of surveyed arbitrators reported that they
do not always follow the law in formulating their awards. And among
labor arbitrators, the "orthodox" position is that arbitrators should adhere
to the collective bargaining agreement and "ignore the law." The
widespread belief among arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply
the law is consistent with standard expectations about arbitration because
"we do not ... expect that an arbitrator will decide a case the way a judge
does. We do not expect that he will necessarily 'follow the law'--or
indeed apply or develop any body of general rules as a guide to his
decision." Even courts have explicitly acknowledged that arbitrators
often do not apply the law. 1
85
The right to vacate an arbitration decision is very limited. 186  Mere
afforded by the statute." [/d. at 229.]
Ware, supra note 109, at 717-18 (citations in original). See also Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating
Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1946 (1996) (noting that
the Supreme Court's view that arbitration does not alter substantive rights "is in keeping with the courts'
expectation that arbitrators will follow applicable legal rulings .... ").
184. Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) ("[T]here is no reason
to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law .. ") (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 & n.19 (1985)); George Watts & Son, Inc. v.
Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he arbitrator is bound to follow the law in the absence
of a valid and legal agreement not to do so."); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456,
1459-60 (1 1th Cir. 1997) ("When a claim arises under specific laws.., the arbitrators are bound to
follow those laws in the absence of a valid and legal agreement not to do so. As the Supreme Court has
stated '[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."' (quoting
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991))).
185. Ware, supra note 109, at 719-20 (citing Mentschikoff, supra note 154, at 851, 867 (footnotes
omitted)); Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction
Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 154-55 (1994); RAU ET AL., supra note 31, at 636; IV IAN
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.5.2.4,
at 40:47 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical
Study, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 59 (1975); Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 683, 688 (1992); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 81, 85 (1992) ("The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to 'do justice as he sees it' and
fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set of facts.")
186. The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
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factual error, and even legal error, typically do not suffice to upset an
award. 187  Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitrator's
determination is enforced absent a showing of "manifest disregard" of
the law.188  After all, the earliest definition of an "arbitration" is "a
deciding, according to one's will or pleasure; uncontrolled or absolute
decision."' 89 Contemporary decisions of arbitrators are thought to be
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in an and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made....
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
187. The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration awards are rare.
Thirty years ago one commentator could write that in the overwhelming majority of that
miniscule portion which are appealed, only an infinitesimal few have ever been vacated. In more
recent years, the amount of "litigious wrangling" over the enforcement of awards-and thus the
number of successful challenges-has unquestionably increased, so as to make that something of
an overstatement. Nonetheless the essential point about judicial deference to arbitral awards still
appears to be valid.
RAU ET AL., supra note 31, at 731; accord IV MACNEIL ET. AL, supra note 185, § 40.1.4, at 40:13
("Over the years, the courts have taken a fairly uniform approach to awards: Awards should be
confirmed and enforced as is unless there is clear evidence of a gross impropriety.").
188. Wilko v. Swan, 34 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See also Brunet, supra note 30, at 28 n. 136
(citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (refusing to vacate
arbitral award in case where "arbitrators' decision does not clearly delineate the law applied, nor
expound the reasoning and analysis used"); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (2d
Cir. 1972) (carefully distinguishing between mistaken constructions of law and manifest disregard of the
law); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) ("[Alrbitrator's
decision must be upheld unless it is 'completely irrational."' (quoting Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d
382 (1972))); Sidarma Societa Italiana Di Armamento Spa., Venice v. Holt Marine Indus., Inc., 515 F.
Supp. 1302, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring difficult to prove deliberate or intentional disregard of the
law in order to come within manifest disregard review), aj'd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981).
Some courts will reverse arbitrators' awards for straying outside the law. For example, the Third
Circuit recently refused to enforce an arbitrator's award that "comported with the arbitrator's view of
fairness," rather than drawing its essence from the applicable collective bargaining agreement. CITGO
Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers Intl. Union Local No.
2-991, 385 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2004). See also infra notes 361-97
189. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 426 (1971) (quoting the "obsolete" definition). The
contemporary definition is also telling: "The settlement of a dispute or question at issue by one to whom
the conflicting parties agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an equitable decision." Id. (emphasis
added). In Black's Law Dictionary, the reference to a substantive baseline is conspicuously absent. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004) ("A method of dispute resolution involving one or more
neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.").
Note the use of the word "arbitration" in Professor Pomeroy's admonition about the dangers of an
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informed by the arbitrator's "experience, knowledge of the customs of
the trade and fair and good sense for equitable relief."' 90
An ADR neutral thus may facilitate or impose a resolution that is not
consistent with controlling principles of substantive law. ADR does not
undermine those principles, however. The decision of an ADR neutral
does not extend beyond the parties before it, because the neutral's
findings and conclusions have no precedential effect.191 This ability to
act in personam, as it were, is both liberating and limiting. 192 The ADR
neutral enjoys considerable leeway to reach a just result without making
"bad law" in "hard cases." 193 Yet the neutral is powerless to effect the
kind of broad social change that could be useful in some
circumstances. 1
94
The occasional need to depart from the strict law likewise animated
the deyelopment of the system of Equity. And through nuance or noble
lie, Equity managed both to follow the law and to depart from it. On one
hand, Equity stood in the shadow of the Law.' 95  One of the most
famous maxims of Equity was cequitas sequitur legem, or Equity follows
unprincipled jurisprudence of Equity:
An accurate conception of equity is indispensable to the due administration ofjustice. If a
certain theory of its nature, which now prevails to some extent, should become universal,
it would soon destroy all sense of certainty and security which the citizen has, and should
have, in respect to the existence and maintenance of his juridical rights.... It needs no
argument to show that if this notion should become universally accepted as the true
definition of equity, every decision would be a virtual arbitration, and all certainty in
legal rules and security of legal rights would be lost.
I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 43, at 44 (emphasis added).
190. Ware, supra note 109, at 721 n.83 (emphasis added) (citing I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25.01, at 391 (rev. ed. 1995)). For an analogous description of Equity,
see supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. See also Campbell, supra note 54, at 111 (noting that
equity can "recognize and enforce principles which actually govern society in general, whether
embodied in the so-called rules of law or not").
191. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 248 (1979); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 35, at 2680; Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End
of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 60 (2004) (stating that ADR procedures "occur out of public view and result
in agreements that have no precedential value").
192. For a discussion of the in personam exercise of Equity jurisdiction see supra notes 184-86
and accompanying text.
193. See generally Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
194. See, e.g., Donald J. Friedman & Michael D. Broaddus, Computer Contract Disputes in the
1990s: Choosing ADR or Litigation, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 6 (1993).
195. A shadow is a common metaphor for the law's effect in ADR. See Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 27.
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the Law. 196 Yet, on the other hand, the very purpose of a separate
system was to correct or to mitigate injustices caused by the rigor of the
Common Law. 1
97
196. See MERWIN, supra note 71, at 60-64. See also CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND
STUDENT 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., Selden Society 1974) (Equity "followeth the law in
all particular cases where right and Justice requireth."); Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16
B.U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1936) (recognizing a maxim that "equity acts according to established rules").
Commentators disagree about the extent to which Equity interfered with the Common Law or abated
its rigors. Sir William Blackstone, citing instances where Equity did not interfere, concludes therefrom
that Equity had no such power. His language is:
[Ilt is said that it is the business of a court of equity in England to abate the rigor of the
common law. But no such power is contended for. Hard was the case of the bond-
creditor, whose debtor devised away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule, which
put the devisee in a better condition than the heir: yet a court of equity had no power to
interfere. Hard is the common law still subsisting that land devised or descending to the
heir should not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor or devisor, although the
money was laid out in the purchase of the very land; and that the father shall never
immediately succeed as heir to the real estate of the son: but a court of equity can give no
relief, though in both these instances the artificial reason of the law, arising from feudal
principles, has long since ceased.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 430.
Professor Pomeroy's caustic response to Blackstone:
The statement in this quotation that "equity had no power to interfere," is merely a
gratuitous assumption; it certainly had the same power to interfere which it possessed and
exercised in the case of an obligor who had paid the debt secured by his bond but had
neglected to take a release. The most that can be truthful said is, that "equity did not
interfere." Blackstone, being purely a common law, had little knowledge of equity, and
his authority concerning its principles and jurisdiction was never great.... This is one
example among many of Blackstone's utter inability to comprehend the real spirit and
workings of the English law. That equity did to a large extent interfere with and prevent
the practical operation of legal rules, and did thus furnish to suitors a corrective of the
harshness and injustice of the common law, history and the very existing system
incontestably show; and that the chancellors, from motives of policy or otherwise,
refrained from exercising their reformatory function in certain instances, is not, in the
face of the historical facts, any argument against the existence of the power.
I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 54, at 55-56, 55 n.1. Justice Story wrote of the varying interpretations of
this maxim:
It may mean that equity adopts and follows the rules of law in all cases, to which those
rules may, in terms, be applicable; or it may mean, that equity, in dealing with cases of an
equitable nature, adopts and follows the analogies furnished by the rules of law. Now,
the maxim is true in both of these senses, as applied to different cases and different
circumstances. It is universally true in neither sense; or rather, it is not of universal
application.
STORY, supra note 55, § 64, at 54 (footnotes omitted). See also FETTER, supra note 53, § 15, at 33
("[The maxim's) chief use has been stated to be the anticipation of a hasty generalization on the part of
the student that equity wantonly disregards the provisions of the common and statute law.").
197. The chancellor had "the right and the power, in fact, to do as he likes, whatever hard law and
still harder practice may dictate." Sevems, supra note 61, at 89. Sir Henry Maine wrote that equity is an
"instrumentality by which the adaptation of the law to social wants is carried on." MAINE, supra note
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The root of Equity was the idea that the law should be administered
fairly, not mechanically, and the rigors of the Common Law were thus
subject to the equitable principles of conscience, equity, good faith, and
honesty. 198 Equity appears in many cases as little more than a canon for
the interpretation of the rules of law. 199 In other cases, Chancery used
equity to render a verdict that compromised the Law, or "split the
baby. ' 200 And in still other cases, Equity could be invoked to ignore or
"correct" the Law.20'
Like ADR, Equity did not claim to override the law. By acting in
personam, Equity could compel a person to perform a duty without
directly challenging or altering the defendant's property rights and
without regard to any contrary judgment rendered in the Law courts.20 2
"Equity" does not intend to set aside what is right and just, nor does it try
to pass judgment on a "strict Common Law rule" by claiming that the
latter was not well made. It merely states that, in the interest of a truly
effective and fair Administration of Justice, the "strict Common Law" is
not to be observed in some particular instance.
203
Moreover, Equity's decision had no precedential effect even in Equity,
much less in Law. 20 4 ADR thus mimics this liberation and limitation in
the exercise of the jurisdiction of Equity.20 5
Finally, both Equity and ADR recognize certain limits to their
equitable competency. Equity did not correct all injustices. In fact,
57, at 23.
198. See I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 385, at 524 ("[Ilt is undeniable that courts of equity do not
recognize and protect the equitable rights of litigant parties, unless such rights are, in pursuance of the
settled juridical notions of morality, based upon conscience and good faith."); "Bona Fides," Equity
Imported into Common Law, 69 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 339, 339 (Feb. 14, 1925) (recognizing an
"imaginary residuum of equitable principles, to secure redress of legal abuses").
199. See J.L. Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 139, 141-42 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973).
200. [Tihere are many cases in which a simple judgment for either party, without
qualifications or conditions, or peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice ex cequo et bono
to either party. Some modifications of the rights of both parties may be required; some restraints
on one side, or on the other, or perhaps on both sides; some adjustments involving reciprocal
obligations, or duties; some compensatory, or preliminary, or concurrent proceedings to fix,
control, or equalize rights; some qualifications or conditions, present or future, temporary or
permanent, to be annexed to the exercise of rights, or the redress of injuries.
I STORY, supra note 55, § 27, at 19.
201. FONBLANQUE ON EQUITY (b. 1, c. 1, § 3) ("For no man can be obliged to anything contrary
to the law of nature; and indeed, no man in his senses can be presumed willing to oblige another to it.").
202. SNELL, supra note 98, at 40-43; MERWIN, supra note 71, at 72-79.
203. Anton Hermann Chroust, The "Common Good" and the Problem of "Equity" in the
Philosophy of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 114, 117 (1942-1943)
204. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
205. SNELL, supra note 98, at 40-43; MERWIN, supra note 71, 72-79.
2005]
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Equity left untouched, in full force and operation, a great number of
legal rules that were certainly as harsh, unjust, and unconscientious as
any of those that it did confront.20 6 In a similar manner, the ADR
movement has not suggested that every legal dispute has a non-judicial
solution. Indeed, the ADR literature recognizes that some types of cases
are not suited to resolution outside the courtroom including, in
particular, cases in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration of law.207
4. The Reflection and Reinforcement of Community Norms
Another motive fueling interest in ADR is that system's ability to
enhance "community involvement in the dispute resolution process. 20 8
This involvement takes two forms. First, ADR empowers
neighborhoods to resolve disputes that are not cognizable in or are
otherwise ignored by formal dispute resolution systems.20 9  Second,
ADR incorporates local values and norms into the decision-making
calculus. 21 0  These values and norms tend to emphasize compromise,
reconciliation, and fairness. 21 1  Thus, while formal adjudication can be
"'a fight unto death in which irreparable harm (economic, psychological,
and spiritual) is done to parties,"' ADR respects "'compromise and
206. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 50, at 51 ("It is absolutely certain from all the existing records,
and from the result itself of their work, that they did not refrain from deciding any particular case,
according to their views of equity and good conscience, merely because the doctrine which they
followed or established in making the decision was inconsistent with the rule of law applicable to the
same facts, nor because the law had deliberately and intentionally refused to acknowledge the existence
of a primary right, or to give a remedy under those facts and circumstances. That this corrective
authority was possessed by the chancellors, and freely exercised by them in the periods of which I am
speaking, is recognized by the ancient writers."); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 430 (noting that
among the legal rules with which equity did not interfere: the doctrine by which the lands of a debtor
were generally exempted from all liability for his simple contract debts); Earl of Bath v. Sherwin, 10
Mod. 1,3 ("A collateral warranty was certainly one of the harshest and most cruel points of the common
law, because there was not so much as an intended recompense, yet I do not find this Court ever gave
relief in it.").
207. For example, James Henry, the founder of CPR, long ago recognized that "[i]f a party is
looking for a precedent or it believed that an opposing party is 'a hotbed of ill will,' then ADR would be
unsuitable... " Milton G. Allimadi, Alternative Conflict Resolution Gaining Popularity with Firms, J.
COMM., Nov. 23, 1992, at 4A (internal quotations omitted).
208. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2. See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8
("To improve public satisfaction with the justice system; ... To restore the influence of neighborhood
and community values and the cohesiveness of communities.").
209. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 6 (recounting the history of neighborhood
justice centers); TOMASIC & FEELEY, supra note 33; DANIEL McGILLIS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
210. See generally Sanchez, supra note 7.
211. See generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J.
1660 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality, and the
Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073 (2001).
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human growth"' rooted in fundamental moral and spiritual principles. 212
The excesses of adversarialism, the importance of reaching the merits,
and a morally infused understanding of justice have already been
discussed in section A of this Part III and in previous subsections of this
section B. The reflection and reinforcement of community norms also
raises issues of access to courts; those issues are addressed in the next
subsection.
5. Access to Justice
Proponents of ADR also emphasize that system's ability to broaden
access to justice. 1 3 ADR initiatives can improve access to justice for
individuals lacking the means and wherewithal to overcome the
intimidating and confusing setting of a courtroom or to navigate the
formal rules of procedure and evidence.214
The recourse to legal actors and proceedings is costly, emotionally
debilitating, and potentially counterproductive. In many respects, justice
has become an empty facade; the august wisdom and high-minded
discipline of the law merely create an appearance of dispensing what is
right and just among parties in dispute. Although adjudication provides
coercive finality to conflicts, the pathway to justice is dehumanizing and
riddled with abusive interpretations of the truth.
215
Psychological, economic, and temporal costs, not to mention linguistic
and cultural barriers,216 made courts ineffective mechanisms for certain
types of disputes and certain categories of disputants.21 7
ADR became the means for enabling "access to justice" when
adjudication failed.2'8  ADR removed certain barriers to formal
212. Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 997, 1001 (2001) (citing Robert D. Taylor, Toward a Biblical Theology of Litigation: A Law
Professor Looks at 1 Cor. 6:1-11, 2 Ex AUDITU 105, 109 (1986); Wayne D. Brazil, The Attorney as
Victim: Toward More Candor About the Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL
PROF. 107 (1978-1979)).
213. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at 2. See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8
("To provide accessible forums to people with disputes; [t]o teach the public to try more effective
processes than violence or ligiation for settling disputes.").
214. See generally Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is It An
Alternative?, 70 N.D. L. REv. 269 (1994); Simon, supra note 25 at, 384-87 (supporting ADR as a means
of expanding access to justice for those unable to afford traditional litigation); Twining, supra note 97,
at 380-82.
215. CARBONNEAU, supra note 92, at l.
216. See generally EARL JOHNSON, COURTS AND THE COMMUNITY (Nat]. Ctr. for State Courts
1978).
217. Galanter, supra note 191.
218. Resnik, supra note 49, at 245; Leonard S. Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the
20051
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adjudication and offered a forum tailored to "fit the fuss." 219 At a very
practical level, ADR presented an inexpensive system for the resolution
of disputes involving amounts of money that would not justify formal
adjudication. At a more conceptual level, ADR offered a new vision of
procedural and substantive justice by offering a less formal system that
invited participation in both the process and the outcome.
Equity was similarly concerned with access to justice, and provided
an alternative forum in those circumstances where the rigidity of the
Law courts failed to provide sufficient relief. Procedure-and even
substance-could be tailored to fit the fuss. And an especially
noteworthy category of Equity's jurisdiction involved providing justice
to the poor.220 Equity asserted jurisdiction over claims by poor plaintiffs
against defendants who were too powerful locally for justice to be
obtainable against them by regular means.221 Indeed, one commentator
referred to this as "[t]he most important of the judicial functions of the
chancellor., 222  Access to Equity was facilitated by a simple
procedure.223  Furthermore, whereas Chancery charged a fee for
obtaining a writ, Equity required no fee.224
Limits of the Adversary System, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 48 (1976).
219. Maurice Rosenberg, Let the Tribunal Fit the Case: Establishing Criteria for Channeling
Matters into Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 80 F.R.D. 147 (1977).
220. E.g., John Feyrewyn v. Richard the Carpenter, 30 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT BILLS IN
EYRE 6 (1292). It is addressed to Sir John de Berewick (one of the King's Justiciars), "you who
are put in the place of our Lord the King to do right to poor and rich." The plaintiff, of
Shrewsbury, says that he paid the defendant six marks, receiving in return the defendant's
undertaking in writing to furnish plaintiff, who was getting ready to go to the Holy Land on
pilgrimage, with board and loding meanwhile. But the wicked defendant will not keep his
agreement; instead of which he only gives plaintiff occasionally a morsel of bread just as if
plaintiff were a pauper begging alms for God's sake. Unless his Lordship helps the plaintiff
before he (his Lordship) leaves town, plaintiff will never get his money back, for the defendant is
clerk of the bailiff of Shrewsbury, and the rich folk of this town all work together to keep the
poor from getting their rights. Plaintiff has no money to hire a pleader, but if his Lordship will
graciously see to it that plaintiff gets his money back, the latter will set out for the Holy Land,
and there he will pray for the King and for his Lordship also.
Glenn & Redden, supra note 51, at 760 n. 17. See also FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 10 (3d ed. 1986) ("Equity also interfered with contracts in order to protect the interests
of weak, necessitous, and unfortunate persons." (footnotes omitted))
221. Barton, supra note 199, at 145-46.
222. Severns, supra note 61, at 93 ("Most of the early petitions seem to have originated in the fact
that the defendant was so rich or so powerful that he could not be brought into court in the usual way.
The phrase 'he is of too great a maintenance' is often found in these bills. The early equity
jurisprudence appears to have consisted of cases where, although there might have been a remedy at law,
yet because the petitioner was poor and the defendant was rich and powerful, the legal remedy was not
satisfactory."). See also W.R. Vance, Law in Action in Mediaeval England, 17 VA. L. REV. 1 (1930).
223. See supra notes 141-47.
224. Severns, supra note 61, at 88.
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IV. TRADITIONAL LAW AND EQUITY-THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
Much of the grand history of Anglo-American law could be
characterized as an epic struggle between the regimes of law and
equity.225 We revere law and the rule of law, yet we contrive to avoid
legalism. 226 That the law must be applied uniformly may be "the most
basic principle of jurisprudence. 227  Yet experience suggests that, a
right too rigid will ultimately harden into a wrong. 228 "Equity plays a
strange role in the structure of law; separate from, and yet a part of the
legal norms., 229 As complements and as rivals, separate systems of Law
and Equity combined to administer the laws for centuries with both
certainty and discretion. 230 This Part builds upon the history of Law and
Equity narrated in Part III, and describes the evolution of both systems
and also their relation to each other.
225. See generally ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed.
1954) ("Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and
discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less trained
intuition of experienced magistrates."); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 17 (1969) ("Every governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and
discretion. No government has ever been a government of laws and not of men in the sense of
eliminating all discretionary power. Every government has always been a government of laws and of
men."); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 24-25 (1990) ("[F]or more than two
millennia, the field of jurisprudence has been fought over by two distinct though variegated groups. One
contends that law is more than politics and in the hands of skillful judges yields ... correct answers to
even the most difficult legal questions. The other contends that law is politics through and through and
that judges exercise broad discretionary authority."). See also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND
CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE 163-93 (1983).
226. Lord Justice Evershed, Equity After Fusion: Federal or Confederate, J. SOC'Y PUB.
TEACHERS L. 171, 171 (1948).
227. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982). See also
CARDOZO, supra note 176, at 112; GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 173 n.13 (Edinburgh Univ. Press
ed., 1952) (noting that "the worst misfortune of a civilized people is doubt about the impartiality of
justice" (internal citation and quotation omitted)); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW:
FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 25-27 (1988).
228. Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and
Equity as Illustrated by Two Maxims, in 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 405 (1915). See SALMOND, supra
note 116, at 97-98; JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 303 (2nd ed. 1921); H.
Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1961)
("Justice is expressed in principles and laws none of which can ever reach the uniqueness of the concrete
situation."); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1918).
229. Ralph A. Newman, Introduction, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note
199, at 15; G. RADBRUCH, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 75 (9th ed. 1952) ("The dilemma
that equity is to be better than justice and yet not quite opposed to justice, but rather a kind of justice,
has troubled men as early as Aristotle's famous chapter V 14 of the Nichomachean Ethics.").
230. See MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 17 ("[F]or two centuries before the year 1875 the two
systems had been working together harmoniously.").
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A. Equity's Reforming Influence on the Law Courts
The early Law courts could have maintained some flexibility and
liberality by simply accepting the new writs issued by Chancery. 231 In
fact, some commentators believe that, had the Law courts accepted these
necessary innovations instead of becoming bemused by form and
precedent, there may have been no need for the creation of a special,
competing court and an alternative system of law.232 But the common
law became a narrow, formalistic system, confined to the method of
granting relief by the award of damages after an injury had been
suffered.233 Preventive or special relief was not available from the
Common Law courts.234 Practical circumstances demanded some
adaptability and elasticity, and when the Law courts failed to meet
contemporary challenges, Chancery filled that void.
English law was thus split into dual systems, with equity and law
flowing in separate channels for centuries. During this period, Equity
intervened in cases to ameliorate the harsh effects of the Common Law,
but also ultimately had a significant reforming influence on the Law
courts. 235  This subpart offers many examples of instances where
doctrines and rules that were once exclusively recognized and enforced
by Chancery were incorporated into the Law whether by statute or by
judicial decision. Indeed, over time the Common Law became
increasingly "equitized. ' ' 236  The enumeration of several examples
serves two purposes. First, from an evidentiary perspective, each
example illustrates the dialectic of law and equity in operation: law fails
to meet a need that is remedied by equity with a method that, in turn, is
ultimately codified into law. Second, from a normative perspective, each
of these useful reforms illustrates the progressive role that equity can
play in the moral growth of the law.237
231. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
232. Oleck, supra note 51, at 36. See also FREEMAN OLIVER HAYNES, OUTLINES OF EQUITY 8-15
(4th ed. 1874); 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 16, at 18-19; 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 403 (5th ed. 1931). One commentator has suggested that the law-equity
dialectic, though causal, was working in the opposite direction. See "Bona Fides," supra note 198, at
340 ("The result of the growth of equity was that the equitable development of the Common Law was
nipped in the bud.").
233. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
234. Oleck, supra note 51, at 36.
235. Garrett, supra note 70 ("The Common Law has plagiarized many things from Chancery.").
236. 7 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74, 75, See also Brendan F.
Brown, supra note 76, at 325; 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 69, at 73-74.
237. See generally E. HOCKING, THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND OF
RIGHTS 2 (1926); 0. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("The law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the
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In the early stages of English law, certain agreements could be
enforced only if the instrument sought to be enforced respected certain
formalities, oftentimes a seal. 238 The formalities served channeling and
cautionary functions, 239 but also served as a bright-line test for the early
Law judges, who had very little discretion. 240  Promises that were not
enforceable in Law because of some formal defect, however, could be
enforced in Equity. 241 "Equity, the sometimes moral policeman of the
law," looked beyond the mere form of a transaction. 242 Recognizing the
sanctity of contract, and the resulting moral obligation to honor one's
promises, Equity could enforce the promise otherwise unenforceable.243
In response to the more evolved position of Chancery, and in fear of
losing a competitive advantage, 2 " the Law courts ultimately developed
and expanded the action of assumpsit to enforce a range of promises,
including unsealed and oral promises. 2
45
The formalities of contract law had also bound the Law courts to a
rule that allowed a creditor to recover a second time from a debtor who
race.").
238. James B. Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, in LECTURES ON LEGAL
HISTORY 98 (1913); Frederick E. Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 24 (1915);
Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM. L. REv. 608 (1910); Eric
Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETrE L.
REv. 617 (1993).
239. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.5, at 86-87 (3d ed. 1999); Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-03 (1941).
240. Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension
Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 509, 522-23 (2004).
241. Frierson, supra note 228, at 412 ("Let us not forget the court of chancery was the first to
ignore the absence of a seal."). See also 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 294-97; Willard T. Barbour,
The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY
16 (Paul Vinogradoffed., 1974) (1914).
242. John McCarthy, Contemporary Advocacy: Value Free?, 38 CATH. LAW. 25,38 (1998).
243. See generally Val D. Ricks, Contract Law and Christian Conscience, 2003 BYU L. REv.
993.
244. Barbour, supra note 241, at 54, 66 ("In fact, there can be little doubt that the eagerness
displayed by certain judges to extend Assumpsit from misfeasance to nonfeasance was prompted by the
strong desire to retain jurisdiction that was fast slipping away."); 2 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 62, at 456 (noting that the "competition of the chancellor"
awakened "even the most conservative common law to the necessity of endeavouring to meet these
demands.").
245. See, e.g., Slade's Case, 4 COKE REPORT 92b, 76 ER 1074 (KB 1602) (presuming existence of
a promise from the fact of a debt and allowing Assumpsit to be brought on a simple promise to pay
money). See generally Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 1176, 1182 (1961); James
Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield's
Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1950-55 (1988); Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A
Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 1983, 2083 (1985); William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L.
REv. 479, 493 (1938); Kittle, supra note 61, at 28-29.
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had paid his debt in full but had neglected to obtain a formal release or a
surrender of the contract document. 246
If he had paid without either getting an acquittance or having his bond
returned to him, he would have to pay again, not.., because this result
was in itself desired, but because "the general grounds of the law of
England heed more what is good for many than what is good for one
,,247singular person only....
"The [Common Law] rule was that a sealed instrument could be
discharged only by another instrument of as high a character, or else by
a surrender of it so that the creditor could make profert of the
instrument .... "248 A debtor facing a demand for payment of a debt
that, in fact, had already been repaid could seek relief in Equity.249 The
chancellor would issue an injunction against the creditor, enjoining him
from enforcing the legal judgment.250  Ultimately, the Law courts
relaxed their jurisprudence to incorporate such defenses as accord and
satisfaction; these reforms ensured a greater uniformity of results in Law
as in Equity.25'
Formalities in contract, again the doctrine of profert in particular, also
precluded a creditor from enforcing an instrument that had been
accidentally lost or destroyed.252 By the formalities of the common law,
the document was the debt;253 hence, there was no notion of secondary
evidence of its contents.254 Because Equity could shape its remedial
processes to meet any new emergency, it acquired jurisdiction in this
class of cases, and for a long time all suits upon such lost negotiable
255paper were necessarily brought in equity. The courts of Law
ultimately abrogated the ancient requirement of profert and, as in Equity,
allowed actions to recover a money judgment upon lost obligations or
246. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 70, at 74-75; Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective
Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 434 (2000) (citing
WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1894); 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 10.15 n.I (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1996) (1950)). See generally Holmes, supra
note 238.
247. MILSOM, supra note 138, at 250 (quoting ST. GERMAN, supra note 196, at 77-79).
248. Kittle, supra note 61, at 32.
249. The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in IV OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 241, at 85-89.
250. Kittle, supra note 61, at 32.
251. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 70, at 74-75.
252. Id. § 72, at 76-77.
253. Kittle, supra note 61, at 32.
254. See generally Glenn & Redden, supra note 51, at 753; MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 6-7;
Walsh, supra note 245, at 483-86 (discussing "the reforming influence of equity").
255. Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY, supra
note 238, at 104; 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 70, at 74-75.
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negotiable instruments to be brought in courts of Law according to the
legal modes of procedure.
256
Equity introduced a moral view of contract and, in particular, of
penalties and forfeitures. 7 The Law courts rigidly exacted all penalties
and enforced the forfeitures of bonds issued in amounts considerably
larger than the sum borrowed unless the payment was done at precisely
the time and in precisely the manner that had been stipulated.258 Yet,
penalties and forfeitures of all types were avoidable in Equity. 259 Equity
looked beyond the form of the transaction and to its substance. 260  It
gave the creditor an amount that was just and equitable, usually
principal, interest, and expenses incurred by the creditor, 261 but would
"restrain the creditor from suing at law for the amount of the bond, on
the ground that such a course was unconscientious and oppressive.
'
"
262
Equity gradually extended this doctrine to contracts other than those
requiring the payment of money.263 Many of those and similar equitable
doctrines were slowly absorbed into the Common Law.264
In reforming the law of property, Equity recognized ownership in the
beneficiary of a trust.265 At Common Law, title to tangible real property
could pass only by livery of seisin, which generally required the physical
256. Id. § 71, at 76; Willard Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in IV
OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 241, at 85-89. See generally Michael
Slattery & Ron Martinetti, The Rights of "Owners" of Lost, Stolen or Destroyed Instruments Under
UCC Section 3-804: Can They Be Holders in Due Course?, 98 COM. L.J. 328 (1993).
257. SPENCE, supra note 95, at 630; KESSLER ET AL., supra note 220, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
See generally Mark Gould, Law and Philosophy: Some Consequences for the Law Deriving from the
Sociological Reconstruction of Philosophical Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 1239, 1310-13 (1996).
258. 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, § 72, at 76-77.
259. D.E.C. YALE, Introduction, 2 LORD NOTTINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES 8-15 (SELDEN
SOCIETY 1957).
260. Two maxims of Equity were invoked here: "Equity looks on that as done, which in good
conscience ought to be done" and "Equity looks rather to the intent than to the form." See HOGG, supra
note 51, §§ 327-328, at 451-55.
261. Kittle, supra note 61, at 32. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY § 30, at 45-46
(1936); HOGG, supra note 51, § 509, at 681-83.
262. FETTER, supra note 53, § 9, at 23-24. See also SNELL, supra note 98, at 340 (noting that
chancery "would cut down the penalty to the amount of the actual damages sustained").
263. FETTER, supra note 53, § 9, at 24. MCCLINTOCK,supra note 261, §§ 30-31, at 45-47.
264. PLUCKNETT, supra note 138, at 677-78; GEORGE L. CLARK, EQUITY: AN ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION OF MODERN EQUITY PROBLEMS § 457, at 613 (1919); MCCLINTOCK, supra note 262, § 30,
at 45-46; HOGG, supra note 51, § 507, at 678; Kittle, supra note 61, at 32-33; SNELL, supra note 98, at
340-41 ("The interference of equity was ... rendered unnecessary by 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, and 4 & 5
Anne, c. 16, which substantially gave the common law Courts similar powers of relief to those hitherto
possessed by equity.").
265. See I AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 1, at 4-5 (4th ed. 1987); SNELL, supra note 98, at 44-48.
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presence of the parties on the land.2 66 Thus, in a conveyance to A for
the use of B, the Law courts denied any claim of title in B and refused to
recognize that B had any right therein.267 In fact, B could be sued at
Law for trespass in taking the rents and profits. Equity, however,
recognized B as the beneficial owner, held A to be a mere trustee for B,
and would enjoin A from prosecuting any action at law against B. "This
recognized the principle of trusts, which in its many phases equity has
always fostered. '' 268 (Equity similarly respected a trust with regard to
tangible personal property, and also the right to transfer title to
intangible personalty, or choses in action.) After the decline the
feudalism as a social and governmental system, courts invoked equity to
eliminate most of the obsolete feudalistic legal doctrines 269-thus
leading to the Statute of Uses.270  Although aimed at restoring tax
revenues to Henry VIII, 271 the statute made it possible to convey legal
title by written deed, replacing conveyances by livery of seisin, and to
create future executory estates impossible under the old law. 272  The
statute also destroyed the power to devise land by will recognized by
Equity, and resulted in the adoption of the Statute of Wills to restore
such power. 273
The lien theory of mortgages is a direct result of the carrying over
266. See S.E. Thorne, Livery of Seisin, 52 LAW Q. REv. 345 (1938); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The
Seventeenth Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 221, 281-82 (1995)
(recounting evolution of English land law). See generally Kittle, supra note 61, at 32-33.
267. Kittle, supra note 61, at 32 (citing WILLIAM W. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO
COMMON LAW 167 (1917); KENELM E. DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 320 (5th ed.
1897)).
268. Kittle, supra note 61, at 33; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29
HARV. L. REV. 816 (1916); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to
Professor Williston, 30 HARV. L. REV. 449 (1917); Walsh, supra note 245, at 484.
269. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 138, at 62; Percy Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme
of Estates, 18 IOWA L. REV. 425, 425 (1933); J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM
1215-1540 (1968); Richard H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503
(1979); Margaret E. Avery, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Court of Chancery Under the
Lancastrian Kings, 86 LAW Q. REV. 84 (1970); Margaret E. Avery, History of Equitable Jurisdiction
Before 1460, 42 BULL. HIST. RES. 129 (1969); A.D. Hargreaves, Equity and the Latin Side of Chancery,
68 LAW Q. REV. 481 (1952).
270. 27 HEN. VIII, ch. 10 (1535) (Eng.). See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 184-88 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing history of Statute of Uses); William
Searle Holdsworth, The Political Causes Which Shaped the Statute of Uses, 26 HARV. L. REV. 108, 465-
67(1913).
271. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 178 (2nd ed.
1988); Holdsworth, supra note 270.
272. See generally Reid, supra note 266, at 281-92; Michael Madison, The Real Properties of
Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 470-71 (2002).
273. Walsh, supra note 245, at 483; CLARK, supra note 264, § 246, at 327-28; 4 WILLIAM SEARLE
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465-67.
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into the law of the principles established by the Chancellor's Court in
the early part of the seventeenth century. Equity, though recognizing the
purely technical legal title of the mortgagee, enforced the real ownership
of the mortgagor by establishing his equity of redemption, and by
charging the mortgagee as a trustee if he exercised his legal right to take
over possession of the mortgaged property and collected the rents and
profits. Equity treated the legal title and right of possession as existing
in the mortgagee only for the purpose of establishing and protecting his
security for payment of the mortgage debt.274
Chancery assumed jurisdiction under any circumstances where the
remedy at law was not plain, adequate, and complete. 275 The inability of
the Law courts to reconcile their rigid forms and processes with the
realities of fraud, undue influence, duress, and mistake originated
doctrines in Equity to address them.276 Equity also created the remedies
of cancellation, restitution, constructive trusts, and specific
performance.277 The protection by injunction of public or social rights is
derivative of Equity. 78 And the modem law of piercing the corporate
veil, fiduciary duties, unfair competition, trademarks, and business rights
were developed in the Chancery courts.27 9
Chancery also intervened when the procedures of the law courts were
inadequate. 280 For example, equity interfered in the name-and with the
imprimatur-of efficiency to avoid the injurious effects of a multiplicity
of actions. 281 Describing the contrast between Law and Equity in these
274. Walsh, supra note 245, at 484-85.
275. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
276. An old English rhyme describes this jurisdiction: "These three give place in court of
conscience, Fraud, accident and breach of confidence." MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 7 n.1. See
Comment, 34 YALE L.J. 432 (1925). See also Frierson, supra note 228, at 412; Walsh, supra note 245,
at 483; Smith, supra note 75, at 314.
277. Smith, supra note 75, at 314.
278. Walsh, supra note 245, at 493.
279. Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 251 (citing Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the
Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905 (1926); VERNON A. MUND, MONOPOLY: A HISTORY
AND THEORY (1933); MYRON W. WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927));
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880-
81 (discussing the equitable origins of fiduciary duties); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 60 (same).
280. See Barbour, supra note 75, at 858 (noting that equity overcame defects that inhered in the
procedure of the law courts and "dealt easily with situations which baffled the common law"); JOHN
MITFORD (LORD REDESDALE), PLEADINGS IN CHANCERY 112 (John S. Voorhies ed., 1833) (noting that
equity exercised jurisdiction where "the principles of law, by which the law courts were guided, give a
right, but the powers of those courts were not sufficient to afford a complete remedy, or their modes of
proceeding were inadequate to the purpose... [or] where the courts of ordinary jurisdiction were made
instruments of injustice"). See generally Main, supra note 85, at 491-95.
281. See generally 1 POMEROY, supra note 55, §§ 243-275, at 318-77. References herein to a
"multiplicity of actions" refer to group (iv). See also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON THE
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instances, Professor Chafee wrote:
A common-law action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually with
only one plaintiff and one defendant but sometimes with several plaintiffs
or defendants tightly bound together as joint obligees or obligors, etc.
Except in such joint situations, however, a dispute of one person against
many persons usually had to come before the law courts, if at all, in the
form of many separate actions. Hence it was far cheaper and more
convenient to have a single suit in chancery, which was accustomed to
handle polygonal controversies .... [I]t was an obvious waste of time to
try... common question[s] of law and fact over and over in separate
actions at law .... It was much more economical to get everybody into a
single chancery suit and settle the common questions once and for all. 282
Thus, Equity would hear a controversy to prevent a multiplicity of
suits, even if the exercise of such jurisdiction called for adjudication on
purely legal rights and to confer purely legal relief.283 Moreover, when
the number of plaintiffs or defendants were too numerous to join in a
single suit, Equity would permit a few of the litigants to represent the
many in connection with an equitable bill of peace, the ancestor of the
contemporary class action.284 Other contemporary procedural staples
traceable to Equity include, among many others, pleading in the
alternative, liberal joinder rules, impleaders, interpleaders, intervention,
and case management.285
The dynamic and unconstrained processes of Equity spurred
innovation and idealism. 286 The repeated exercise of the jurisdiction of
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 178 (2d ed. 1948) (stating that "the plight of a defendant at law, subjected to
one hundred and ten separate actions arising from the same accident, many of the actions being brought
in different counties and some of them set for trial in the different counties at the same time, so that it
would be impossible for the witnesses for the defense to attend each trial, is one that calls for some sort
of relief if it can be given" (citing S. Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 47 So. 274 (1908))).
282. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950).
283. Main, supra note 85, at 492 (citations omitted).
284. See I POMEROY, supra note 55, § 269, at 367-68 ("[T]he jurisdiction may and should be
exercised, either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single party, or on behalf
of a single party against such a numerous body, although there is no 'common title,' nor 'community of
right' or of 'interest in the subject-matter,' among these individuals, but where there is and because there
is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the general
controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual
member of the numerous body."). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); CHAFEE, supra note 282, at 200.
285. Main, supra note 85, at 471-73 (citations omitted).
286. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. See also I JOHN FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE
OF EQUITY § 3 (A. Strahan & W. Woodfall eds., 1793) ("So there will be a necessity of having recourse
to natural principles, that what is wanting to the finite may be supplied out of that which is infinite. And
this is properly what is called equity, in opposition to strict law .... And thus in chancery every
particular case stands upon its own particular circumstances; and, although the common law will not
decree against the general rule of law, ye chancery doth, so as the example introduce not a general
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Equity identified the systemic failures of the Common Law and
ultimately had a reforming influence.
B. Rigor Equitatis
(or the Common Law's Reforming Influence on Equity)
"What starts as a boon often ends as a boomerang." '287 Earnest,
"[s]imple, inexpensive and speedy in its origins," by the eighteenth
century Equity had become idly corrupt, "exceedingly complicated,
,,288 W e h aunbelievably slow, and inexcusably expensive. When Chancery was
exposed to the pathogens of strict law, it suffered a fate worse than that
which plagued the Common Law.289
Equity began to experience a process of systematization in the early
seventeenth century. 290 Many presumed that Chancery could not remain
a "fountain of unlimited dispensations.,, 291  To reform the
"heterogeneous medley of isolated empirical remedies," 292 Bacon issued
one hundred rules of equity that were "wisely conceived, and expressed
with the greatest precision and perspicuity." 293  Chancery no longer
"decide[d] every individual case according to the result of a sort of
ransacking search for the particular set of conscientious principles
applicable to the case."294 Chancery began to respect precedent.295 And
mischief. Every matter, therefore, that happens inconsistent with the design of the legislator, or is
contrary to natural justice, may find relief here.").
287. Sevems, supra note 61, at 106.
288. Smith, supra note 113, at 112.
289. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 228-29 (1927) ("The situation was bad
enough at law, but much worse in equity."); A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 349 (2d ed. 1950)
("Gradually the rules of equity themselves came to suffer the fate of rules of law, and became
stereotyped.").
290. Barbour, supra note 75, at 858-59 (dating "the change" in equity to the era of James I). See
generally Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian
Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 483 (1997); Haskett, supra note 75.
291. Frederick Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 293 (1882) (noting that Chancery became "as regular a court of
jurisdiction as any other"); MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 9 ("In the second half of the sixteenth century
the jurisprudence of the court is becoming settled.").
292. Smith, supra note 75, at 315.
293. 2 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT
SEAL OF ENGLAND 134 (5th ed. 1868) ("They are the foundation of the practice of the Court of
Chancery, and are still cited as authority.").
294. H.G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 45 LAW Q. REV. 196, 205 (1929).
295. As early as 1663, in an aggravated case of fraud Lord Clarendon dismissed the plaintiff's bill
for lack of a precedent. See Roberts v. Wynn, I Chan. Rep. 236, 21 Eng. Rep. 560 (1580). See also
Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 585, 591 (1672) (discussing the logic of consistency); Brown, supra note
76, at 321-22 n.12 (discussing Cook and noting that the tendency toward stare decisis increased in
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particularly under the chancellorships of Lord Nottingham and Lord
Hardwicke,296 the exercise of equity became ever more circumscribed
and predictable. 297 And as Nottingham and Hardwicke "deliberately set
out to reduce equity to a system of rules established by precedent,, 298
the jurisdiction of Equity "crystallized. 299
This is a predictable phenomenon: as soon as a system of law
becomes reduced to completeness of outward form, "it has a natural
tendency to crystallize into a rigidity unsuited to the free applications
which the actual circumstances of human life demand., 300 But as the
jurisdiction of Equity lost its youthful exuberance, so also its freedom,
elasticity, and luminance.30 ' Equity lost religion and found
Chancery throughout the eighteenth century); Keeton, supra note 159, at 476 (suggesting that respect for
precedent was not introduced in Equity until the eighteenth century); Smith, supra note 113, at 112
(suggesting that Chancery was far more deeply in bondage to precedent than was the common law); I
POMEROY, supra note 55, § 59, at 59-60 (quoting Lord Keeper Bridgman, "Certainly, precedents are
very necessary and useful to us, for in them we may find the reasons of the equity to guide us; and
besides, the authority of those who made them is much to be regarded. We shall suppose that they did it
upon great consideration and weighing of the matter, and it would be very strange and very ill if we
should disturb and set aside what has been the course for a long series of time and ages.").
296. Lord Nottingham served as Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682. See generally 4 CAMPBELL,
supra 293, at 236-79. Lord Hardwicke served from 1736 to 1756. See generally 6 id. at 158-304.
297. See Sparks, supra note 77, at 477 (noting that "as time passed on... opposition gradually
diminished"). See, e.g., Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413, 428 (1802) ("The cases which occur are
various, but they are decided on fixed principles. Courts of equity have in this respect no more
discretionary power than courts of law. They decide new cases, as they arise, by the principles on which
former cases have been decided, and may then illustrate or enlarge the operation of those principles; but
the principles are as fixed and certain as the principles on which the courts of common law proceed.").
298. Severns, supra note 61, at 105-06; Brown, supra note 76, at 319 ("[Hardwicke] labored
indefatigably to forge those positive precepts which in his estimation would best externalize the
traditional philosophy of Chancery."); Hanbury, supra note 294, at 196 (suggesting that Nottingham
initiated the first transformation of Equity "from a heterogeneous medley of isolated empirical reliefs
into a stable and increasingly rigid system of rules").
Some commentators credit (or blame, as the case may be) Eldon for completing the process of
defining and limiting Equity. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 98, at 468.
299. See Hanbury, supra note 294, at 205 (Nottingham "stiffened and rationalized old ideas and
turned them to permanent and practical use."). See also James O'Connor, Thoughts About the Common
Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 161, 164 (1928) (referring to the "crystallized conscience" of equity). See
generally MAITLAND, supra note 63, at 9 (noting that during the sixteenth century, "[t]he day for
ecclesiastical Chancellors is passing away"); Paul Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth
Century Jurisprudence, 24 LAW Q. REV. 373 (1908); SHAPIRO, supra note 225, at 158; 6 CAMPBELL,
supra note 293, at 158.
300. SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 57 (1875). See also MAINE, supra note 57, at 19-21
(explaining that equity is a stage in the growth of law, whereby it is expanded but ultimately fossilized);
Pound, supra note 86, at 711-12 (comparing law to the rules and formulas of the engineer, where the
engineer is informed by the wisdom and experience of predecessors); Raymond Evershed, Is Equity Past
Child-bearing?, I SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1953) (discussing equity and modern legislation).
301. See Johnson, supra note 196, at 350 ("Equity became handcuffed by a rigorous body of rules
and concepts."); see also id. at 351 ("The times were not suitable for reasoned discretion. The public
demanded 'certainty."').
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procedure. 302 The administration of equity, much like the administration
of law, became "entangled in the intricacies of its own processes and
broken down of its own weight."30 3 Corruption made things worse.30 4
For litigants, Chancery became a nightmare. Five years was a minimum
for a creditors' bill to be disposed of, even where there was neither
exception nor appeal.30 5 Sometimes a case was delayed more than thirty
years.30 6 Charles Dickens' Bleak House is a depiction of this era of
Chancery. 30 7  Chancery thus became a jus strictum differing little from
the Common Law except in point of identity of the judicial decisions it
had made its own.30 8 Indeed, by the first quarter of the nineteenth
century, equity "had become so fixed, so certain, that lawyers could say,
'There is nothing new in equity."'
30 9
C. The Merger of Law and Equity
The ossification of Equity was happening simultaneously with the
302. See generally 1-2 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY
(1894) (two volume set of Equity pleading rules); EDWARD HUGHES, THE EQUITY DRAFTSMAN (1st
Amer. ed. 1832) (a tome of nearly one thousand pages describing the procedural rules of Suits in
Equity). See also WALTER C. CLEPHANE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE (1926).
303. Equity, in fact, did "lose religion." Part of the systematization of Equity was an attempt to
secularize it. See generally Moser, supra note 290; Haskett, supra note 75. St. Thomas More was the
first lawyer chancellor (1529-1532). He succeeded Cardinal Wolsey (1515-1529) and was described by
Maitland as "the last of the great ecclesiastical Chancellors" The last ecclesiastic was Dr. Williams,
Bishop of London (1621-1625), and the last non-lawyer was Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of
Shaftesbury (1672-1673). See MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 1-11. Smith, supra note 113, at 112. See I
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 232, at 426 ("Firstly a suit in equity very often lasted very many years. This
no doubt is true of some common law actions; but it is clear that the fact that many equitable cases
involved the taking of accounts and enquiries, necessarily made the proceedings more lengthy than the
general run of common law actions, which turned on a clear cut issue of fact or law."); Charles Synge
Christopher & Baron Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in
I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516, 529 (Ass'n of American Law Schools ed.,
1907) ("'No man, as things now stand,' says in 1839 Mr. George Spence, the author of the well-known
work on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 'can enter into a Chancery suit with any
reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a determined adversary.').
304. Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion. Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of
Chancery, Part 11, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 565 (2004); Smith, supra note 113, at 112-13.
305. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 236, at 433 (citing C.P. COOPER, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SOME
OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, RELATIVE TO THE DEFECTS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY, THE HOUSE OF LORDS, AND THE COURT OF
COMMISSIONERS OF BANKRUPT 86 (1828)).
306. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 236, at 375.
307. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
308. See Gane, supra note I, at 572; see also Brown, supra note 76, at 325 ("In the eighteenth
century... not only was Chancery following the Law, but the Common Law in turn was becoming
more and more equitized."); supra note 236 and accompanying text.
309. Severns, supra note 61, at 106.
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equitization of the Common Law. 3 10  The Common Law had absorbed
many of the best practices of Equity, 311 and with Equity reduced to rigid
doctrines applied as mechanically as the Common Law, maintenance of
a separate system was superfluous.
312
The merger of law and equity consummated the centuries-long
relationship of cooperation, competition, and copying. 313  Differences
between the systems were viewed as merely procedural, and a
widespread and escalating contempt for procedure suggested that such
distinctions were impractical and unnecessary.314 There was little
tolerance for the delays, the expense, and the technical complications
that resulted from maintaining separate courts of Law and Equity.
315
Procedure could better fulfill its functional and secondary role if a single
set of procedural rules facilitated the joint administration of the
substantive principles of both Law and Equity.
316
Other articles have argued that in merging the systems of Law and
Equity, reformers may have swept away part of the wisdom that guided
the development and operation of dual systems. 317 One virtue of an
autonomous system of Equity was its authority to act in opposition to
the strict law when the unique circumstances of a particular case
demanded intervention.318 The architects of the merger purportedly took
great pains to sustain this virtue by preserving the substantive principles
of both Law and Equity in a merged system; only the procedure was
310. Smith, supra note 113, at 110-14 (tracing key elements of reforms in the systems of both
Law and Equity to the middle of the eighteenth century).
311. See supra notes 231-86 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
313. This story has been narrated. See generally Subrin, supra note 14; Main, supra note 85. For
a more complete discussion of the history of Law and Equity, see generally PLUCKNETr, supra note 138,
at 381; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 61; 1-2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62; 1 STORY, supra note
55; Kittle, supra note 61; KERLY, supra note 61; Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal
Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REv. 195 (1914); Adams, supra note 61; Pound, supra note 86;
Holdsworth, supra note 69; Robert L. Munger, A Glance at Equity, 25 YALE L.J. 42 (1915); Henry H.
Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 58 (1911).
314. See generally Main, supra note 85.
315. See William Searle Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7
(1929). See generally Main, supra note 85.
316. See Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1925); Main,
supra note 85.
317. See Main, supra note 85.
318. See Holdsworth, supra note 69, at 293 (stating that "the root... of equity [is] the idea that
the law should be fairly administered and that hard cases should as far as possible be avoided").
CARDOZO, supra note 176, at 65 ("[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement rather than another,
there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of
larger ends."); Campbell, supra note 54, at 110 (noting that principles of equity are a part of the larger
concept of fairness and justice upon which all law must be based).
386
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modified, they insisted. 31 9 But even assuming that the antagonistic
substantive regimes of Law and Equity can co-exist and be applied
contemporaneously within a single unified procedural system, a
fundamental flaw inheres in the procedural infrastructure of a merged
system. 320 For in denying Equity any structural autonomy, there remains
no relief from the procedures of the merged system itself when the
modes of proceeding in that system are inadequate. 321 Thus when the
unanticipated situation arises, courts have no choice but to follow the
procedural rules drafted instead for the anticipated situations.322 For no
matter the judicial discretion that is supposedly codified 323 in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,324 there remains a schemata of
procedural rules that is increasingly prolix, complex, and rigid.
3 25
Moreover, the assumption that a merged court can apply the
substantive principles of law and equity is an uncertain one. To be sure,
many statutes and common law doctrines have incorporated the
fundamental equitable principle of individualized justice. This principle
is reflected in the evolution of broad principles as opposed to narrow
rules,326 broad grants of discretionary authority,327 variable standards of
319. See Ralph E. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV.
186, 187 (1949). See also PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING 15 (3d ed. 1894)
(stating that codes "affect modes of procedure"); Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the
Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 240-43 (1942); Stephen N.
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision,
6 LAW & HIST. REv. 311, 329-30 (1988).
320. See Main, supra note 85.
321. Seeid. at495-514.
322. See infra notes 476-91 and accompanying text.
323. The ironic use of the term codification should be emphasized.
324. See Subrin, supra note 14, at 929, 970-82; Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's
Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PTr. L.
REV. 725, 725 (1989) ("[A]s to the pretrial portion of litigation, equity conquered law"); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) (explaining that the relaxed procedures of equity
allow activist judges to take control of litigation throughout the pretrial stage); Jack B. Weinstein &
Eileen Herhenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 278-81 (offering
examples of how equity has dominated legal system through "modes of proof and trial," and the "varied
circumstances in which courts today turn to equitable remedies" in mass tort cases); Melissa A. Waters,
Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort
Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 542-51 (2002) (discussing equity's triumph in mass tort trial procedures);
Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 1993 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53-54 ("The war
between law and equity is over. Equity won."). See also Chayes, supra note 28, at 1292-96 (discerning
in public law litigation the "triumph of equity"); 1 CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE PREF. (1930) (covering, among other highlights, "[t]he history of equity, and its triumph
over law").
325. See Main, supra note 85, at 479-86.
326. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158-62 (1991); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Robert F. Nagel, The
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conduct, 328  balancing tests, 329  leeways of precedent, 330  and the
acceptance of legal fictions. 33 1 That equity intervenes when there is no
adequate remedy at law is a most familiar refrain. 332 Courts frequently
exercise their broad discretion to award various equitable remedies, and
courts have used the awesome power of equity to create entirely new
rights.
333
Yet, the legacies of neither Law nor Equity can be fully preserved in a
merged system. "Law and equity cannot be blended or homogenized
because they are [fundamental] antitheses.,, 334 "Each [system] has a
function to perform that requires some freedom to act upon the
other." 335  Ironically, the Lord Chancellors responsible for
"crystallizing" Equity believed strongly in the separation of Law and
Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
327. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980); ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 123-
24(1982).
328. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); James Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat
from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between
Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of
Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
329. See generally Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); James G.
Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 773 (1995).
330. See generally Aldisert, supra note 176, at 605; Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
331. See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967); Louise Harmon, Falling Offthe Vine:
Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); MAINE, supra note
57, at 17-36.
332. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 687 (1990); Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).
333. See generally William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1993). See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 17 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) (invoking the judiciary's "historic equitable remedial powers" in the school
desegregation context to require busing). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); MALCOLM M. FEELY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (2000); GARY
L. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1982) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of equity to implement a political vision that
is inconsistent with positive law). But see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (limiting scope of substantive equity to rights existing in 1789).
334. Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 248; Percy J. Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. CHI.
L. REV. 741, 747 (1934) ("In an indiscriminate 'fusing' or an indiscriminate borrowing, these principles
are likely to be lost. They are likely to be lost even in the administration of equity itself by judges with
only a legal point of view.").
335. Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 248.
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Equity. Lord Bacon wrote that: "All nations have equity. But some
have law and equity mixed in the same court, which is worse; and some
have it distinguished in several courts, which is better., 336 Indeed, to
perform its high office, equity must be administered as a check upon
strict law and in opposition to it. But this requires for equity a selfhood
that cannot be fully replicated within a merged system. 337
V. CONTEMPORARY DUAL SYSTEMS-THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
The alternative appearance of law and equity as the law's
complementary yet competing modalities is a lasting, not transitory
phenomena. With the systems of Law and Equity merged, ADR stepped
into the breach to operate as a check upon the "strict law" that is now
codified in the procedures of the merged system. Like Equity, ADR
offers procedural flexibility and discretion. 338 And by channeling
Equity's emphasis on the moral and ethical significance of
individualized justice, ADR offers an alternative substantive vision.339
The maturation of ADR into a rival system of adjudication has already
transformed formal adjudication: the courts have been "ADRized. 340
Meanwhile, ADR becomes increasingly formalized and adversarial.34'
A. ADR's Reforming Influence on Formal Adjudication
The contemporary understanding of adjudication has been thoroughly
transformed by the ideology and processes of ADR. At the most basic
level, ADR has invented entirely new and innovative structures for
resolving disputes; and these structures are finding their way into
courts.34 2 Many commentators have reflected upon this "capture,
colonization and cooptation" of ADR by courts. 3 4 3 Or, cast less
336. 7 THE WORKS OF SIR FRANCIS BACON 448 (2000). See also I STORY, supra note 55, § 35, at
27. Lord Hardwicke held the same opinion. JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY,
App. 504-05 (1828).
337. Id. at 255.
338. See supra notes 120-75 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 176-207 and accompanying text.
340. Stempel, supra note 5, at 300 (discussing the "ADRization" of the courts). See J. Clark
Kelso & Thomas J. Stipanowich, Protecting Consumers in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAO., Fall 1998,
at 11.
341. Resnik, supra note 49, at 253-54; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 5, 13-16; Katz, supra
note 173, at 5.
342. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL, 241, 246-47 (1996); Resnik, supra note 49, at 213; Stempel, supra note 5,
at 302.
343. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 5, 13-17 (explaining that ADR was meant to
3892005]
HeinOnline  -- 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 389 2005-2006
390 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.74
pejoratively, formal adjudication has recognized the comparative
advantage of ADR processes in certain contexts and has borrowed them.
Whether in the form of court-annexed arbitration, mediation, summary
jury trials, early neutral evaluation, or some other form, various ADR
processes have been woven into the dispute resolution fabric so that
ADR options are systematically considered at various points along the
litigation path. 3 34
Judges, especially so-called managerial judges,345  have also
incorporated some of the premises and practices of ADR by viewing the
promotion of settlement as an important part of the exercise of the
traditional judicial function.346 Various ADR techniques such as
mediation and settlement conferences are no longer "extrajudicial," but
"challenge" the adversarial system, but instead ADR has been taken over and changed by the system,
and that capture, "colonization," and co-optation have transformed ADR into "just another stop in the
'litigotiation' game"); Katz, supra note 173, at 5 (stating that "voluntary nature of alternatives has been
eroded," and that it is problematic for ADR to take on formalistic characteristics of adjudication); Eric
R. Galton & Kimberlee K. Kovach, Texas ADR: A Future So Bright We Gotta Wear Shades, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 949, 950 n.4 (2000). Resnik, supra note 49, at 262-63 (citing Craig A. McEwen, Lynn
Mather & Richard J. Maiman, Lawyers in and Everyday Life: Mediation in Divorce Practice, 28 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 149, 183 (1994) (explaining that mediation of divorce in Maine as is used in "heavily
litigated" cases, relies on "legal rules," serves as a "relatively formal adjunct to negotiation," and
"strengthens ... the ability of lawyers to influence decisions.")).
See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory
Reform, 5 OHIO. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 233 (1990) (criticizing Supreme Court enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate as undermining the volition critical to arbitration's integrity, and lauding
arbitration for its capacity to provide "adjudicatory, self-determination"); Richard C. Reuben, The Dark
Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 53-54 (growing concern about the bills of court-appointed,
court-annexed ADR providers); Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 349, 353
(1993) (critiquing proposed "guidelines for selecting mediators" as both wrongly portraying the role and
also restricting access to the profession). Cf Brunet, supra note 185 (calling for constitutional rights in
private contractual arbitration to ensure due process fairness); James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe,
Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171
(2001); Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903
(1997); James J. Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized?: To the Parties,
Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOI. 307 (1994); Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation
About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 11, 29
(warning of the potential corruption of the mediation process by "litigizing" it).
344. Sander, supra note 33, at 5.
345. Resnik, supra note 324, at 380 ("[M]anagerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our
standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.").
346. A manual encouraging newly appointed judges to facilitate settlements explains: "Optimal
justice is usually found somewhere between the polar positions of the litigants. Trial is likely to produce
a polar solution, and often the jury or judge has no choice except all or nothing. Settlement is usually
the avenue that allows a more just result than trial." Philip W. Tone, The Role of the Judge in the
Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 57 (1975),
as quoted in RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 640 (4th ed. 2004).
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rather are "regular features of civil process."' 347
The growth of ADR has contributed to the beginning of a revolutionary
change in the court's conception of its role from that of a passive provider
of trials to an active, problem solving case manager, or, as in some courts,
to a catalyst in community change and conflict transformation. 
348
In complex litigation matters, in particular, ADR innovations have
been incorporated wholesale into formal adjudication. 349 To the delight
of logophiles, the combination of these various practices with litigation
have created the phenomena of litigotiation, 35  medigation 351 and
arbigation. 
352
At a more theoretical level, ADR has revitalized discussion about the
goals, norms, methods, and results of contemporary adjudication. 353
ADR has empowered parties by giving them ownership in the dispute
resolution process; 354  this empowerment, in turn, has generated
processes that reflect a greater range of economic norms, ethical
precepts, and other cultural beliefs.355 By inviting interdisciplinary
study, ADR has enriched and has been enriched by the perspectives of
behavioral science, organizational theory, and other disciplines. The
culture of conflict resolution has experienced a shift in emphasis from
the adversarial to a problem-solving model.
3 56
Ironically, the ADR movement ultimately may be more
successful at transforming courts than transforming lawyers or disputes.
Recent court decisions suggest that at least some jurists have embraced a
new vision of the objectives of the justice system, a vision in which the
purpose of legal dispute resolution is to achieve social harmony, rather
than to assess factual and legal claims and articulate public norms.
357
347. Rensik, supra note 37, at 186-87.
348. Louise Phipps Senti & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and
Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 327, 333 (2003).
349. James F. Henry, Some Reflections on ADR, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 63 (discussing the
incorporation of ADR methods).
350. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1342 (1994).
351. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness and Freedom in
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 306 & n.4
(Winter 2002/2003).
352. Id. at 314.
353. Lande,supra note 112, at 148-49.
354. Thomas A. Kochan, Brenda A. Lautsch & Corrine Bendersky, An Evaluation of the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 233 (2000).
355. Lande, supra note 112, at 150.
356. Henry, supra note 349, at 63.
357. Hensler, supra note 13, at 193.
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ADR has changed the practice of law. 358 Conflict management, as
opposed to mere conflict resolution, has become significant.359 Courts,
judging, and the aspirations of dispute resolution all have been
transformed.36°
B. The Ossification of ADR
(or Adjudication's "Reforming'" Influence on ADR)
The popularity of ADR and its influence on formal adjudication is a
sure sign of a boon.3 6 1 But beware the boomerang.362 Indeed, the system
of ADR popularized by its flexibility and informality now faces the
inexorable demands to crystallize its processes.
363
Waves of reforms have already begun to systematize ADR. The new
Uniform Mediation Act bemoans the persistence of "more than 2,500
state and federal statutes" governing mediation, and purports to offer
"one comprehensive law" that would ensure certainty regarding
particular segments of mediation practice. 364 The 2000 revisions to the
Uniform Arbitration Act detail "better and more complete arbitration
procedures to meet modern needs," and are intended "to provide
uniformity in law." 365  The American Arbitration Association has
published voluminous and non-trans-substantive procedural rules that
the parties to an ADR agreement may incorporate by reference.366 The
358. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 122-23 (1991); Lande, supra note 112, at 148-49.
359. Henry, supra note 349, at 63.
360. Id.
361. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 287.
363. See generally Developments, supra note 24, at 1874 (discussing numerous proposals
representing efforts "to impose order on the creative chaos that has nurtured the ADR movement"). See
also AMOS, supra note 300, at 57.
364. See Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Mediation Act, http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformactwhy/uniformacts-why-uma.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). For the text of the
Uniform Act, see http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2005). See generally Uniform ADR Effort Sparks First-Time Collaboration, 16 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH
COST LITIG. 58, 58 (1998) (describing a three- to four-year joint effort of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association to produce a uniform law);
ABA Meeting Examines Uniform Mediation Act, 53 DIsP. RESOL. J. 6, 6 (1998) (noting great concern
over confidentiality in mediation due to the variations in state laws).
365. See Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Arbitration Act, http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformactwhy/uniformacts-why-uaa.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). For the text of the
Uniform Arbitration Act, see http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.htm (last visited Apr.
11,2005).
366. The American Arbitration Association web site prescribes "Rules and Procedures" in dozens
of subject matter areas, including commercial disputes, wills and trusts, construction, commercial
finance, and the wireless industry. See http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
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CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and JAMS, among others, have
also published comprehensive sets of procedural rules for various ADR
proceedings. 367 A host of ethical standards affecting neutrals and ADR-
providers have been promulgated by national ADR professional
organizations, by state-wide regulatory or judicial bodies, by individual
court or community ADR programs, and by individual ADR provider
organizations.368 And a number of protocols intended to protect the
rights of employees, consumers, and other vulnerable parties have been
advanced.369
The number and significance of cases that are now resolved in ADR
lead well-intentioned reformers to demand that ADR be systematized to
provide sufficient "due process" protections.
370
With regard to length, embedded in the "Commercial Arbitration Rules and Procedures" are definitions
followed by fifty-four basic arbitration rules, ten more rules regarding expedited procedures, an
additional four rules for complex matters, and eight optional rules regarding emergency measures of
protection. An additional section of rules pertains to the payment and amount of fees. See
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
367. See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration,
http://www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.asp?M=9.3.5 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); JAMS Comprehensive
Arbitration Rules and Procedures, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp (last visited Apr.
11,2005).
368. See, e.g., AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, prepared
jointly by committees of the American Bar Association and the American Bar Association; Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators, prepared jointly by committees of the American Bar Association,
the American Arbitration Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution; CPR-
Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider
Organizations (May 1, 2002); CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in
ADR, Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral (Final draft,
2002); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 31; Fla. Rules of Ct. for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators 10.820,
10.83; Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators § I; Kan. Rules Relating to Mediation 903; Va. Standards of
Ethics and Prof'l Resp. for Certified Mediators; CDRC Standards of Practice for California Mediators;
Minn. Gen Rules of Pract. for the Dist. Cts. 114 app. Code of Ethics.
See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Updating Arbitrator Ethics: Code Revisions Acknowledge
Developments in Consumer, International Arbitration, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 24; Ruth
V. Glick, Should California 's Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide? No! They Are Overbroad and Will
Discourage Use ofArbitration, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 13.
369. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
ON MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998); DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL ON
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF HEALTH CARE DISPUTES (1998); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES ON ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYER-
PROMULGATED SYSTEMS (1987); The Protocol: Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, in JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M.
ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES app. B, at 171-78 (1997). See
generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 369 (2004).
370. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 579; Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
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Major ADR providers adhere to certain minimal due process constraints
prescribed by three due process protocols, including the employment
dispute resolution protocol, the consumer protocol, and the health care
protocol. The major ADR providers have voluntarily moved to bolster the
"due process guarantees" of their processes.
3 71
And because "it is common to equate the adversary system with the
idea of due process itself, ''372 recent and proposed reforms to ADR tend
to mimic the characteristics of formal adjudication. 373  Reforms to
systematize the role of neutrals would demand that neutrals be certified,
formalize the selection of an impartial neutral, demand written rationales
supported by specific facts, insist that neutrals follow the law, introduce
rules of evidence, and subject determinations to some form of appellate
review.374 Meanwhile, the participants in ADR are increasingly thought
to be entitled, as a matter of right, to discovery, to be represented by
counsel, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and more.
375
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). "[C]ourts are [also] recreating many of the due
process safeguards from nineteenth century courts." Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial
Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
249, 250 (2003).
371. Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: Form ADR as Idealistic Movement to a
Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 935 (2002).
372. Rubenstein, supra note 218, at 48.
373. See Sherman, supra note 102, at 2082-83 (suggesting that litigation and ADR have "a great
deal in common [because b]oth place a high value on a rational approach to dispute resolution, fairness
of process, and the centrality of party autonomy. The claim that ADR is not adversary fails to appreciate
that it is fundamentally a process of assisted negotiation.").
374. Dwight Golann, Making ADR Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487,
493 (1989) (highlighting problems with ADR processes, including the right to a jury trial, separation of
powers, due process and equal protection); see also Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The
Proliferation of the Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (1989); Wayne D. Brazil, Special
Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
394 (1986).
375. Recent proposed protocols call for elements such as the right to a competent and impartial
neutral, representation, prehearing access to reasonably relevant information, full availability of
remedies, and reasoned, written opinions. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 370, at 987-
88; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 60.
For a sample of reform efforts regarding the Uniform Model Mediation Act, see, e.g., Symposium on
Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 787 (1998); Model Mediation
Law Effort Begins, DiSp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 20; expanded judicial review of arbitration awards,
see, for example, Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 124-29 (1997) (contending that parties should be allowed to
incorporate a desired level ofjudicial review into their contract); Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review
to Correct Arbitral Error-An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL. 103, 110-16 (1997)
(arguing that parties ought to be able to contract for whatever level of judicial review will serve the
parties' interests, but suggesting limiting review to legal error to avoid substantial increased costs);
Leanne Montgomery, Casenote, Expanded Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards-
Bargaining for the Best of Both Worlds: Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th
Cir. 1997), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 554 (2000) (reviewing the Lapine decision and concluding that
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Further, arbitrators are often statutorily vested with broad judicial
powers to administer depositions 376  and discovery, 377  including
subpoena378 and sanction powers.37 9 Arbitrators often write opinions,38 °
and their cases grow increasingly complex through procedural
machinations of consolidation and intervention. 381 Professor Sherman's
conclusion, in 1993, that ADR and formal adjudication had "a great deal
in common" grows ever truer.382 Indeed, Professor and Judge Sabatino's
1998 article catalogs the formalization of ADR processes, referring to
ADR (fondly) as "Litigation Lite." 383 And the public, or at least lawyers,
appear to want still more formalization. 384  For example, an
advertisement for National Arbitration Forum in a recent issue of the
ABA Journal reads:
All Arbitration is Not the Same. Unlike the others, only the Forum offers
a national panel of seasoned legal professionals and a procedural code
contracting for increased judicial review may encourage continued use of arbitration)); personal liability
for arbitrators, see Mark A. Sponseller, Note, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified
Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421, 421 (1993); Note, Gaar v. Tigerman: An Attack
on Absolute Immunity for Arbitrators!, 21 CAL. L. REV. 564, 585 (1985); amending arbitration laws to
protect the contracting process from corruption, see Steven Goering, The Standard of Impartiality as
Applied to Arbitrators by the Federal Courts and Codes of Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 832
(1990); oversight of arbitrators, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
407, 408, 419 (1997); ethics reforms, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-
Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 166-92 (1999); prohibiting ADR in certain cases,
see. Weinstein, supra note 342. See generally Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without
a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1337,
1362 (2002).
376. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (2005), 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1283,
1283.05 (West 2006).
377. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1283.05, 1283.1.
378. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1282.6.
379. See 9 U.S.C. § 7; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1283.05. See also Katz, supra note 173, at 37-41.
380. James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAW. 107, 109
(Jan./Feb. 1985) (discussing an arbitration where the panel's opinions "delivered over the course of eight
months, totaled more than 600 pages in length and provided detailed explanations, often with citations,
for each decision").
381. Sabatino, supra note 39, at 1289.
382. Sherman, supra note 102, at 2082-83.
383. Sabatino, supra note 39, at 1289 (suggesting that evidentiary norms ofmateriality, relevance,
hearsay, and privilege are replicated in ADR practice). See also Stempel, supra note 5, at 343.
384. Professor Reuben argues that the surprisingly small amount of "voluntary" participation in
ADR programs is attributable to the lack of formal due process protections. Reuben, Constitutional
Gravity, supra note 370, at 987-88. See generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL, INSTITUTIONALIZING ADR
PROGRAMS IN COURTS, appdx. C; Why 'Volunteer ADR Programs are Likely to Attract Few Cases, and
thus, Why Volunteer Programs are Not Likely to Contribute Significantly to Cost and Delay Reduction,
in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 52, 122 (ABA 1991).
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requiring arbitrators to follow the law in making decisions and awards.
To learn more about the National Arbitration Forum, log onto the world
wide web at www.arbitration-forum.com. 
385
And, of course, courts continue to struggle in their efforts to figure out
which cases belong in ADR.
The "creeping legalism" of ADR is ironic because ADR's popularity
was a product of its flexible and informal processes.3 86 And with this
formalism, the processes of ADR have become increasingly complex,
costly, and time consuming. 387 It should hardly surprise, then, that the
contemporary empirical data fails to demonstrate conclusively that ADR
is, in fact, always faster or cheaper than formal adjudication.388 For
385. ABA Journal 14 (October 2004) (emphasis added).
386. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISp. RESOL. J. 37, 38 &
n.l (2003).
387. Id.
388. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-
Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986) (finding no significant, demonstrable savings in
court-annexed ADR); Deborah R. Hensler, RAND's Rebuttal: CJRA Study Results Reflect Court ADR
Usage, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 79 (1997) (finding court-annexed arbitration had little
effect on time to disposition or costs); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND
EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 48-53 (RAND 1996) (arguing
that arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation produced no "statistically significant" reductions
in time to disposition, the costs of litigation, perceptions of fairness, or client satisfaction); Deborah R.
Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass
Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (1995) ("[E]fficiency gains from court-annexed
arbitration and court-mandated family mediation in custody suits appear mixed: The fiscal savings to
courts from diverting cases from trial may be outweighed by the costs of running an efficient ADR
program, and savings in lawyer time are often modest and not necessarily passed on to litigants through
lower legal fees."); Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness 's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 248 (1992) ("Mandated settlement
conferences have been in use in state trial courts for at least four decades. Their effectiveness at saving
costs has yet to be demonstrated empirically."); Bernstein, supra note 154, at 2211 (stating that "there is
no conclusive evidence that [court-annexed ADR] programs reduce either the private or social costs of
disputing"); Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000) (noting that "cases referred by courts to ADR activities ... lasted
longer, on average, than the mean for all cases"); Dayton, supra note 100, at 921 (comparing districts
with and without court-annexed ADR and finding that "ADR districts are neither more efficient nor
more effective in handling their caseloads or inducing settlement than their peer districts"); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 40, at 9 n.33 (collecting sources).
Until [1973], when the [American Arbitration Association's] 50-year-old logo was
redesigned, its motto was "Speed, Economy, and Justice." That year [the Association's
president, Robert Coulson] dropped the motto. "People used to promote arbitration with
those adjectives like religious zealots," he says. "I don't think any of these words are
entirely accurate."
Lyons, supra note 380, at 107. See also Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 155, at 30 ("Today's research
confirms what Hart and Sacks saw twenty-six years ago: arbitration may be quicker than litigation, but it
is not less expensive."); Reuben, supra note 343, at 54-55 (using anecdotal information to question
whether arbitration is really cheaper than litigation); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 452-76 (1988) (observing that many survey respondents disagreed that
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decades, practitioners have reported that arbitration is neither faster nor
cheaper than more formal adjudication. 389 This is surely attributable, at
least in part, to the fact that many of the procedural bells and whistles of
formal adjudication already have been incorporated into arbitration
proceedings. 390
C. Toward a "Merger" of ADR and Adjudication
The itineraries of ADR and formal adjudication thus identify a
common destination: ADR is being "litigized '' 391 while litigation is
being "ADRized. 392 The path toward full integration of ADR and
formal adjudication has been paved; in fact, that road has even been
named: 393  "CDR," which stands for complementary dispute
resolution,394 quite literally takes the "alternative" out of ADR. "I like
arbitration was faster and cheaper than litigation).
On the other hand, of course, there are many who trumpet the time and cost savings associated with
ADR-particularly outside the arena of court-annexed ADR.
The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution claims that for a five-
year period ending in 1995, 652 companies using CPR panelists reported a total cost
savings of over $200 million, with an average cost savings of over $300,000 per
company. A 1993 article contended that since 1990, 406 companies saved more than
$150 million in legal fees and expert-witness costs by using litigation alternatives in
cases with an aggregate of over $5 billion in dispute. One insurance carrier allegedly
saved between $150,000 to $200,000 per case by mediating disputes pursuant to a pact
negotiated by the Institute for Dispute Resolution.
Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 2073, 2105 (2002) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
389. Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, 13 ARB. J. 129 (1958); Lyons, supra note 380, at
110. ("' I tell my clients,' one lawyer says, 'that it should cost just as much for a complex construction
arbitration as it costs for litigation."'); id. ("But, as one arbitration veteran warns, 'Once you get Wall
Street lawyers in there, you might as well go to court.' The Kaiser/Condec arbitration is an
extravagant-but not unique--deomnstration of the fact that the costs of arbitration rise dramatically if
the parties hire big outside law firms, call large numbers of witnesses, and present elaborate technical
arguments."); Jones, supra note 7, at 193 ("[I]t is asserted that arbitration is frequently a drawn-out
process since many cases drag on for months or even years and sometimes end up in court anyway.").
390. See Martha Neil, Litigation Over Arbitration, A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (Jan. 2005) ("Arbitration is
beginning to look more and more like litigation... There's more discovery. There's more motion
practice. There are concepts such as summary judgment that until recent years were foreign to the world
of arbitration." (quoting David A. Hoffman, Chair of the A.B.A.'s Dispute Resolution Section)).
391. Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 93 (2002); Brazil, supra note 343.
392. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
393. Stempel, supra note 5, at 308 (advocating adoption of more ADR practices).
394. See generally Sabatino, supra note 39, at 1291; Paul L. Tractenberg, Using Law to Advance
the Public Interest: Rutgers Law School and Me, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1001 (1999); Russel Myles &
Kelly Reese, Arbitration: Avoiding the Runaway Jury, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 129, 129 n.1 (1999)
("Perhaps a better name for ADR is 'complementary dispute resolution' because it frequently is used in
conjunction with rather than in lieu of a lawsuit which has already been filed or may potentially be filed
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to think of ADR as not alternative dispute resolution but more
complementary dispute resolution. We do not replace the judicial or the
criminal justice system. We work along side it. We complement it. It's
not an either/or proposition."
395
No longer "discrete conversants," formal adjudication and ADR have
"begun to be 'integrated,' 'melded,' or 'collapsed' into each other."
' 396
But with the two systems looking increasingly like each other, the
advantage of dual systems of justice is lost.19 7
VI. MAKING THE CASE FOR EQUITY IN ADR
Hopefully, suggesting that justice remains the essential purpose of
law is not naive. Equity, certainly in its historical moral sense, and
perhaps in its administrative sense, is the principal technique thus far
developed to make certain that law will be readily adaptable for, and
directed toward, the achievement of justice. 398 Fortunately, then, equity
enjoys a certain inevitability. 399 When the rigidity of the Law courts
failed to keep pace with the growing wants of society, the discretionary
and flexible system of Equity provided the sensible remedies.4 °°
Similarly, when the forms and modes of formal adjudication became
insufferable, ADR emerged to provide a sensible method of dispute
resolution that was discretionary and flexible. 40 1 ADR offered a check
upon the "strict law" by generating experimental methods of dispute
resolution with fresh perspectives on procedural and social justice.4 2
Yet the law's demand for certainty is equity's foil. An ironic
consequence of Equity's success was the ensuing effort to crystallize the
jurisprudence of that court.4 03 The gradual introduction of procedural
in the future."); Alfini et al., supra note 343.
395. James Coben & Penelope Harley, Intentional Conversations About Restorative Justice,
Mediation and The Practice of Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 235, 292 (2004) (quoting Jeanne
Zimmer).
396. Resnick, supra note 49, at 214 (referring to a theory about the evolution of the systems of
ADR and formal adjudication). See also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation:
Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004).
397. See supra notes 10 1-224 and accompanying text.
398. Oleck, supra note 51, at 44.
399. Glenn & Redden, supra note 51, at 753 ("Equity is a thing of continuous growth, and not the
sort of Phoenix that dies ever so often.").
400. Kittle, supra note 61, at 27 ("Many cases arose in which all men of sense admitted that there
should be a remedy provided, but which the narrow-minded judges denied.").
401. See supra notes 105-207 and accompanying text.
402. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural
and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004).
403. See supra notes 287-300 and accompanying text.
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rules and structural orthodoxy ultimately caused Equity to collapse
under the weight of its own precedents and processes.4 °4 The legacy of
Equity was preserved in those doctrines that had been adopted by the
Law courts,40 5 but equity is less dynamic and generative in a merged
system.40 6 ADR reanimated the spirit of equity.40 7 But because of
ADR's tremendous popularity, 40 8 ADR now faces a wave of reforms
that would transform its flexible and discretionary modes of resolution
into a more systematic framework.40 9 One might suggest, of course, that
this transformation of ADR is inevitable in light of the ongoing dialectic
between law and equity. Moreover, the inevitability of equity, too, will
ultimately resurface thereafter in some form or another (as ADR
succeeded Equity). Those suggestions, though accurate, do not justify
inaction, however, because the pace and trajectory of that progression
can be moderated. Rather than allowing ADR to ossify, why not
maximize the benefits of the administration of justice through dual
systems?
In broad design, the emerging system of ADR should be enabled to
perform much of equity's function in the administration of justice. But
in the same way that the sweeping jurisdiction of (traditional) Equity
was untrammeled by any definite rule,410 ADR must enjoy genuine
discretion and flexibility.4a ' And thus we should be skeptical of reforms
that would introduce detail or complexity. Lord Hardwicke probably did
not anticipate that by weaving "the strands of judicial decision making
into the indestructible fabric of equitable jurisprudence, 412 he was
crafting the cloth that would later asphyxiate his beloved Equity. ADR
faces a similar fate if it simply replicates the modes and methodology of
formal adjudication. Neutrals in an independent system of ADR should
404. See supra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 231-86 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 317-37 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 105-224 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 361-97 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. See also I FONBLANQUE, supra note 286, § 3
("So there will be a necessity of having recourse to natural principles, that what is wanting to the finite
may be supplied out of that which is infinite. And this is properly what is called equity, in opposition to
strict law .... And thus in chancery every particular case stands upon its own particular circumstances;
and, although the common law will not decree against the general rule of law, ye chancery doth, so as
the example introduce not a general mischief. Every matter, therefore, that happens inconsistent with
the design of the legislator, or is contrary to natural justice, may find relief here.").
411. Oleck, supra note 51, at 25 (noting that equity must be a "living, changing thing, forever
adapting itself to new conditions").
412. Brown, supra note 76, at 337 (lauding Lord Hardwicke's indefatigable and worthy efforts on
behalf of Equity).
20051 399
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be free to experiment and to adapt to the challenges of the case before
them without any obligation or duty to external statutes or rules.
Although that jurisprudence may be unpredictable, rough, and intuitive,
equity is a purposeful counterpoint to the elegance and monotheism of
law.413 The moral growth of the law is the record of the slow emergence
of equity into the mainstream of the law.4 14 Dialectic requires dialogue,
and it is through the interplay of law and equity that both are
enriched.415
Law and equity should be in continual progress, with the former
constantly gaining ground upon the latter. Every new and extraordinary
interposition is, by length of time, converted into an old rule. A great part
of what is now strict law was formerly considered as equity, and the
equitable decisions of this age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict
law of the next.
4 16
ADR thus plays an important role in the growth of the law. Without this
engine of equity, "our law will be moribund, or worse. 4 17 ADR has
been and should remain a creative force for developing innovative and
superior methods of dispute resolution.4t 8
This aspiration may be consistent with those commentators who have
suggested that "the best use for ADR may be to resolve the types of
cases that are extremely difficult or exceedingly costly to resolve in
court. 4 19 This suggestion resonates with the law-equity model because
the jurisdiction of Equity consisted entirely of cases where the legal
remedies were inadequate. 420 But the premise that ADR should hear
those cases that the formal system cannot adequately resolve leads to an
uncomfortable conclusion, because the most profound examples of such
cases are some of society's most important. Chayes' public law cases, 421
Fiss' structural suits,422 Rifkind's problems, 423 and Fuller's polycentric
413. 1 have lifted these exquisite descriptors from an email to me from Professor Paul Horton.
414. Munger, stipra note 313 (discussing the history and progress of equity "from conscience to
precedent"); Bordwell, supra note 334, at 750 ("The equity of today becomes the right of tomorrow.");
FREDERIC R. COUDERT, CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE 1 (1914) ("On the one side is made an appeal to
progress, on the other to precedent."); Newman, supra note 229, at 15, 18.
415. Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 255.
416. 2 JOHN MILLAR, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 358 (1789).
417. Bordwell, supra note 334, at 749.
418. See supra notes 25-49, 105-224 and accompanying text.
419. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 24, at 437.
420. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
421. See Chayes, supra note 28. See also Frank M. Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal
District Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV. 903 (1976); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
422. Fiss, supra note 333; Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations ofAdjudication, 6
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cases 424 all strain the competencies of traditional formal adjudication.
Could mass torts, environmental management, employment
discrimination, voter reapportionment, and school desegregation cases
belong in ADR-a flexible and discretionary system modeled on Equity
without appellate review, more distanced than courts from the pressure
of public opinion, and lacking the prospect of impeachment and other
safeguards against the dangers of unbridled discretion?
Other commentators have suggested that we should "reserve the
courts for those activities for which they are best suited" and should
therefore "avoid swamping and paralyzing them with cases that do not
require their unique abilities., 425 This, too, resonates with a law-equity
model, although the functions of formal adjudication and ADR are
reversed. This approach, which could be characterized as the opposite of
the first proposal, allocates the difficult and important cases to formal
adjudication, and the mine-run to ADR.42 6 But the premise that simple
or repetitive cases can be resolved outside of courts may understate the
important role of courts in the tasks of applying the law and vindicating
rights. The application of law to fact is the source of the court's
legitimacy, if not also its primary responsibility.427 Can such an
important task be outsourced?
The fundamental problem is that ADR requires a selfhood to perform
the high task of equity, yet its privatization is, understandably, very
troubling.428  Privatized extrajudicial dispute resolution that is
undertaken by parties knowingly and (truly) voluntarily is, of course,
eternal and not problematic. 429 But individuals with, say, mandatory
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982). See generally Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991).
423. Rifkind, supra note 16, at 51. See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY IN JUDGES ON JUDGING (David M. O'Brien ed., 1997).
424. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). See
generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 148.
425. Sander's Pound Conference speech.
426. See generally COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF THE COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1984); Hensler, supra note 13, at 194 (noting that the "core competence of today's courts is
adjudication").
427. Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than
its erection and enforcement of a system of rules and defining the various rights and duties of its
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an
orderly predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization and cohesion are
virtually impossible .... Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that allows
society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the "state of nature."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1970).
428. Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "Justice", 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535 (2005); Judith Resnik,
ADR Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
429. See supra notes and accompanying text.
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arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and health plan contracts
are not in that group. Whether or not those cases are among those that
require ADR, they are surely deserving of a publicly sponsored forum of
dispute resolution. Thus for whatever cases are deemed appropriate
(regardless of whether there exists an agreement to submit to ADR),
there should be a genuinely flexible and discretionary system of ADR
that can be administered from within the public apparatus.
Professor Sander's multi-door courthouse may be the most promising
resolution.430 In the system he envisioned, persons with disputes would
be directed by a screening clerk to the "room" containing the appropriate
dispute resolution mechanism. Paraphrasing Sander, he imagined that
the room directory in the lobby might look as follows:
Mediation Room 1
Med-Arb Room 2
Arbitration Room 3
Minitrial Room 4
Superior Court Room 5
Importantly, if equity is to be preserved, the neutrals in several of
these rooms would need substantial leeway to act in their equitable
discretion. One might imagine an increasing quantum of discretion as
one moved up the list. Importantly, cases assigned to formal
adjudication could be re-assigned later to more discretionary forms of
dispute resolution when the forms and modes of formal adjudication
proved inadequate. 431 As a safeguard for equity, one might imagine a
one-way ratchet whereby cases could easily be re-assigned to fora "up"
the list, but where a strong presumption resisted re-assignment "down"
the list.
Bringing law and equity under one roof is not a novel concept. For
well over a century, the federal court system administered law and
equity on different "sides" of the court and by different procedures.432
430. For a description of the multi-door courthouse, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
431. 1 have argued for example that application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a given
instance may not provide the litigants with plain, adequate, and complete relief. Historically, under
separate systems of Law and Equity, such procedural inadequacy would justify resort to the flexible and
discretionary system of Equity. The merger of Law and Equity purports to have retained the substance
of Equity; yet the substance of Equity is, in fact, not preserved unless there is some escape from the
merged system itself when the procedures of that merged system prove inadequate. Main, supra note
85, at 444-47.
432. See Schurmeier v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 F. 1, 16 (1909) (Sanbom, J., dissenting)
("The union of legal and equitable causes of action in one suit is prohibited by § 913, Revised Statutes
(United States Comp. St., 1901, at 683), and in removal cases, when such a union is permitted in the
state courts from which they come, the causes of action must be separated into distinct actions at law
and suits in equity in the national courts."). See generally Ingersoll, supra note 313, at 65 (recognizing
402
HeinOnline  -- 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 402 2005-2006
2005] ADR: THE NEWEQUITY 403
The federal courts tried cases at law and suits in equity within a "temple
of justice... [metaphorically] constructed with a partition extending
from the foundation to the roof. ' 433 Federal judges thus alternately
played the role of common law judge or of chancellor. 434 Of course, the
merger of Law and Equity ultimately followed and judges have since
been assigned the responsibility of upholding the goals of both certainty
and individualized justice. But neither Law nor Equity can perform the
other's function, and a merged system may perform neither function
particularly well.435 Hence the attractiveness of Sander's multi-doored
temple of justice where, in theory at least, reinforced partitions could
ensure that justice (whether law, equity, or law and equity) is publicly
administered at the Dispute Resolution Center.
Recall that some historians "blame" the Common Law for the
development of a separate system of Equity: but for the stubborn
two sides to the court "and between them there is no possible connection"); Glenn & Redden, supra note
51, at 757 (explaining that "the same judge would do equity work one day and sit as a common law
judge on another"); U.S. Comp. Stat. § 913 (1901) (requiring the forms and mode of procedure in equity
be according to the rules and usages of courts of equity); id. § 917 (authorizing Supreme Court to
prescribe rules of practice in courts of equity); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY
RULES 2-4 (7th ed. 1930).
For cases discussing a separate jurisdiction in equity, see, for example, Fenn v. Holme, 42 U.S. (I
How.) 484, 485, 487 (1858) (noting that distinction explicitly declared in the constitution and separate
jurisdiction carefully defined and established); Berkey v. Cornell, 90 F. 717, 718 (1898) (explaining that
separate equitable jurisdiction extends to cases involving purely legal rights); Thompson v. Cent. Ohio
R.R., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867) (noting that law and equity not to be blended together in one
suit); and Noonan v. Lee, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 499, 509 (1862) (separate jurisdiction is constitutionally
required). See also Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1927).
433. Gustavus Ohlinger, Problems of Jurisdiction and Venue, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 240, 255 (1944).
434. See Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 6 N.C. L. REv. 283, 284 (1928).
435. See supra notes 310-37 and accompanying text. See also Main, supra note 85, at 476-95.
The tendency ... has plainly and steadily been towards the giving an undue prominence
and superiority to purely legal rules, and the ignoring, forgetting, or suppression of
equitable notions.... In short, the principles, doctrines, and rules of equity are certainly
disappearing from the municipal law of a large number, of the states, and this
deterioration will go on until it is checked either by a legislative enactment, or by a
general revival of the study of equity throughout the ranks of the legal profession.
See also I POMEROY, supra note 55, at ix; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 39 (citing MARTIN
SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (198 1) ("To what extent will courts lose
their legitimacy as courts if too many other forms of case-processing are performed within their
walls?")); Emmerglick, supra note 68, at 248 ("Law and equity cannot be blended or homogenized for
they are antitheses. The one strives for predictability and treats cases as belonging to a generalized type,
the other strives for individual justice and treats cases as being unique. Each has a function to perform
which requires freedom to act upon the other."); Newman, supra note 229, at 15, 17-18 (suggesting that
merger "has given rise to what might be called a law of equitable fission, which causes the principles of
equity, when they are introduced into the relatively unfriendly atmosphere of strict law, to lose their
force and to fly apart, like atoms in an exploding universe, inhibiting their complete reception and
leaving in their wake, scattered on the surface of legal institutions, only fragmentary applications of the
principles.").
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resistance of the Law courts to innovation, there may have been no need
for the creation of a special, competing court and an alternative system
of law.436 Tradition and lack of imagination may similarly explain the
emerging system of ADR. Although courts have incorporated ADR in
significant ways, courts ultimately are constrained by procedure and
substance. Formal adjudication fails to provide plain, adequate and
complete relief, and the system of ADR is the outlet: "[E]ven though
arbitrating a matter might end up costing as much as litigation,
businesses like being able to limit discovery, set their own rules for
presenting evidence, schedule proceedings at their own convenience and
select the third party who will decide their cases. 437
Maitland wrote that a system of Equity without Law would be
"anarchy"-the oft-mentioned "castle in the air."4 38 Seldom quoted is
the accompanying statement that a system of Law without Equity would
be "barbarous, unjust, [and] absurd., 439 The reconceptualization
exercise imagined ponders whether that castle might instead be placed
inside a public Dispute Resolution Center.
VII. CONCLUSION
A dialectic of law and equity can be traced from the dual traditional
systems of Law and Equity to the contemporary systems of formal
adjudication and ADR. The equitization of Law and the legalization of
Equity led ultimately to the merger of Law and Equity. In contemporary
adjudication we are experiencing, simultaneously, the "ADRization" of
litigation and the litigization of ADR. The merger of Law and Equity
offers a cautionary tale. Appreciation for the role of ADR in a dual
system founded in principles of law and equity would deregulate ADR
and transform public forms of dispute resolution.
436. Oleck, supra note 51, at 36. See also HAYNES, supra note 232, at 8-15; 1 POMEROY, supra
note 55, §§ 16-20, at 18-25; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 232, at 402-05.
One commentator has suggested that the law-equity dialectic, though causal, was working in the
opposite direction. See "Bona Fides," supra note 198, at 340 ("The result of the growth of equity was
that the equitable development of the Common Law was nipped in the bud.").
437. Neil, supra note 390, at 50 (quoting Douglas A. Darch, a Chicago attorney who represents
companies in employment cases).
438. MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 19.
439. Id.
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